The Professionalization of the American Army through the War of 1812 by Heiss, Robert L
State University of New York College at Buffalo - Buffalo State College
Digital Commons at Buffalo State
History Theses History and Social Studies Education
8-2012
The Professionalization of the American Army
through the War of 1812
Robert L. Heiss
State University of New York College at Buffalo, ubpsych@hotmail.com
Advisor
Andrew D. Nicholls, Ph.D., Chair and Professor, History and Social Studies Education
First Reader
Andrew D. Nicholls, Ph.D., Chair and Professor, History and Social Studies Education
Second Reader
David A. Carson, Ph.D., Distinguished Service Professor, History and Social Studies Education
Department Chair
Andrew D. Nicholls, Ph.D., Professor of History
To learn more about the History and Social Studies Education Department and its educational
programs, research, and resources, go to http://history.buffalostate.edu/.
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.buffalostate.edu/history_theses
Part of the United States History Commons
Recommended Citation
Heiss, Robert L., "The Professionalization of the American Army through the War of 1812" (2012). History Theses. Paper 10.
Abstract 
 
The Professionalization of the American Army through the War of 1812 
  
 The American military tradition stretches back to the militia of England.  The English 
colonists brought a tradition of militia service and a fear of standing armies to America.  Once in 
America, the colonies formed their own militias, using them for defense and then later for 
offensive operations.  At the time of the American Revolution the American colonies had to 
combine the militia with an army.  The fear of a standing army hindered the Continental Army, 
and then later the American Army, from being an effective force.  By the time of the American 
Civil War, this had changed.  There was a standing army as well as thousands of trained officers.  
When did the transformation of the American military from a citizen based ideal to a 
professional force occur?  
  
Many historians point to the decades between 1820 and 1840 as the years when the army 
professionalized.  This thesis proposes that the War of 1812 was the defining event that spurred 
the professionalization of the American Army.  To achieve this, the American military tradition 
from the earliest colonists to the mid-eighteenth century is explored.  This thesis divides these 
two hundred and fifty years into eras.  Several authors’ works are compared in each era to assess 
the state of the army and how it had changed from the previous era.  The requirements of a 
professional army, the transformation of the army’s organization, and the attitude of the 
American people will be analyzed in order to determine what sparked the professionalization of 
the American Army. 
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Introduction 
 “A militia is the most natural defence of a free state, from invasion and tyranny…Men 
who enlist themselves for life, soon lose the feelings of citizens.”1The thirteen colonies that 
would become the United States of America had a long standing tradition of praising the civilian 
who took up arms against his enemies.  Hand in hand with this sentiment was a distrust of 
military authority and of professional soldiers.  Both of these traditions had arisen from the 
colonies’ English heritage.  Allan Millet and Peter Maslowski state that, “The colonists’ most 
revered military institution (the militia) and their most cherished military tradition (fear of a 
standing army) both came from England.”2  The colonists’ experience in North America would 
add to this heritage.   
During the American Revolution, the sentiment against a standing army was high.  This 
was due to a mixture of political heritage, military experience, and philosophical ideology.  This 
sentiment promoted the heroic encounters of the militia.  Robert K. Wright Jr. states that, “The 
rhetoric of protest against British policy had strongly denied the need for a large “standing army” 
of regular soldiers in America on the grounds that the colonial militia forces, composed of 
virtuous citizen-soldiers, were perfectly adequate for local defense…Lexington, Concord, and 
Bunker Hill only seemed to confirm the validity of that assumption.”3  Congress was realistic 
and saw the need for an army, yet the army was always complemented with militia.  According 
to Millet and Maslowski, “Throughout the war the Continental Army complemented rather than 
supplanted the state militias, and at practically every critical juncture these disparate forces acted 
                                                          
1
 Thomas Welsh, “Oration, Delivered at Boston, March 5, 1783,” in Anglo-American Antimilitary Tracts 
1697-1830, ed. Richard H. Kohn (New York: Arno Press, 1979), 174-175. 
2
 Millet and Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America (New 
York: Free Press, 1984), 1. 
3
 Robert K. Wright Jr., The Continental Army (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History United States 
Army, 1986), 43. 
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in concert.”4  In contrast, during the Mexican War, six decades later, it was the Regular Army 
that was in the forefront of battles and campaigns.  Russell Weigley states that in the Mexican 
War, “The regulars always went to the decisive front; the volunteers were used as though they 
were auxiliaries.”5 
  Sometime during these years, the American Army began its transformation toward 
becoming a professionalized force.  In the nineteenth century the most important aspect to a 
professional army was a large number of professional officers.  In the previous century, armies 
were small, highly drilled forces.  With the advent of the levee en masse, introduced in the 
Napoleonic Era, the size of armies exploded.  In order to quickly train large numbers of new 
soldiers, armies relied upon a large corps of educated professional officers.   
In order to obtain these professional officers the army needed several things.  First, the 
position had to be full time.  Second, officers who entered into the military had to see it as a 
lifelong career.  Third, there had to be a military institution that could produce highly trained 
officers.  Fourth, the army had to be competently organized with high standards.  And lastly, the 
army had to be accepted by the society in which it resided.6 
It is the intention of this thesis to highlight the profound impact that the War of 1812 had 
on the professionalization of the American Army.  Prior to the war, the American military was 
still semi-professional.  During the American Revolution the majority of the Continental Army 
was comprised of militia.  Furthermore from 1789 up until the beginning of the War of 1812, the 
Regular Army amounted to just over 6,000 men.7  During the War of 1812, there were never 
                                                          
4
 Millet and Maslowski, 57. 
5
 Russell F. Weigley, Towards an American Army: Military Thought from Washington to Marshall (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 36. 
6
 See William B. Skelton, An American Profession of Arms: The Army Officer Corps, 1784-
1861(Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1992). 
7
 Statistics from Francis B. Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary of the United States Army: From 
its organization, September 29, 1789 to March 2, 1903 Vol.2 (Urbana: Univ. of Illinois Press, 1965), 626. 
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more than 36,000 regulars, on paper.8  In the 1790s and in the first decade of the nineteenth 
century, the army had a few professionalizing reforms.  Yet, the power of the anti-standing army 
sentiment prevented the formation of a professional army.  The War of 1812 brought the 
deficiencies in the American military to the attention of the American government, and brought 
forth a new generation of officers who would lead the professionalization. 
Since this topic covers two centuries of history, a wide range of scholarship had to be 
consulted.  There are four authorswhose work closely mirrors this one, and whose work the 
author has frequently cited.  Allan Millet and Peter Maslowski outlined the whole history of the 
American military tradition in their work For the Common Defense: A Military History of the 
United States of America.  Millet and Maslowski both describe the dual tradition of the American 
army, militiamen and regulars.   
Russell F. Weigley produced several works regarding the early American Army.  In 
History of the United States Army, Weigley outlined the history of the American military from 
colonial times to the mid 1980s.  Weigley’s Towards an American Army: Military Thought from 
Washington to Marshall was heavily weighted towards the theoretical aspect of the army.  This 
work examines two authors of American military thought in each era of American history.  The 
American Way of War is along the lines of the Weigley’s previous work.  This book begins at the 
American Revolution and traces military thought up to the Vietnam War. 
Edward M. Coffman’s The Old Army: A Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime, 
1784-1898 focused on the soldiers and officers away from war.  This work is informative for 
such issues as frontier life, education, careerism, pay, and other such issues associated with the 
early peacetime army. 
                                                          
8
 Heitman, 626. 
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William B. Skelton has written numerous works on the professionalization of the 
American Army and its officer corps.  Skelton expanded on Coffman’s work to produce a 
thorough observation of the early American Army.  In An American Profession of Arms: The 
Army Officer Corps, 1784-1861, Skelton examined a number of important issues in the 
development of the army during this time.  Skelton’s in depth analysis of the army is quite 
extensive, particularly helpful are the number of figures and graphs illustrating the officers’ 
background and career length.  In his article, “The Commanding Generals and the Question of 
Civil Control in the Antebellum U.S. Army”, Skelton related the establishment of the General 
Staff and the position of the Commanding General in 1821.  Skelton examined the impact the 
War of 1812 had on the American Army in “High Army Leadership in the Era of the War of 
1812: The Making and Remaking of the Officer Corps.”   
All of these works point to the decades between the War of 1812 and the Mexican War in 
1846, as the time when the American Army pushed towards professionalization.9  This was due 
to many factors which will be examined later.  In “High Army Leadership in the Era of the War 
of 1812: The Making and Remaking of the Officer Corps”, Skelton examined the officer corps 
during the War of 1812.  In his article Skelton stated, “By the later stages of the war, the 
performance of the officer corps was steadily improving, partly through administration efforts to 
advance talented men but, more important, through the experience that young officers had 
acquired by years of field service.”10  It is the goal of this thesis to expand upon Skelton’s work 
and to place greater emphasis on the War of 1812 as the turning point towards the 
professionalization of the American Army.  
                                                          
9
 Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 
144-172; Skelton, An American Profession of Arms, 109-130. 
10
 William B. Skelton, “High Army Leadership in the Era of the War of 1812: The Making and Remaking of 
the Officer Corps,” The William and Mary Quarterly (Third Series Vol. 51, No. 2), 274. 
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Due to the magnitude of the topic, the first chapter traces the militia heritage of the 
American military prior to the American Revolution.  This chapter focuses on two contributing 
factors; the seventeenth century history of England, and the militia’s colonial experience.  In the 
seventeenth century, the clashes between the King and members in Parliament highlighted a 
debate over the consequences resulting from a standing army.  This era highlighted issues 
concerning standing armies and militia.  Once in America, colonists had to defend themselves 
against the Native Indians, pirates, and other European nations.  In the early stages of 
colonization the colonists learned to gain trust in their militia, and their ability to defend 
themselves.  At the end of the seventeenth and into the eighteenth century, the colonies began to 
send out inter-colonial military expeditions against Indians and then against European soldiers. 
The second chapter covers the American military from the American Revolution to the 
eve of the War of 1812.  In these years the tradition of the dual army arises in the American 
military.  The need for a professional army in order to defend the nation was countered by the 
fear of a military aristocracy and dictatorship.  This chapter also focuses on the change in the 
notion of a professional army in Europe.  During the second half of the eighteenth century, small 
professional armies with career soldiers were prominent.  During and after the Napoleonic Era, 
armies became large, with a great number of professional officers trained in Military Academies.  
The American military attempted to emulate some of these examples, but the War of 1812 would 
prove that they had not succeeded. 
The first two years of the War of 1812 are discussed in the third chapter.  The semi-
professionalism of the American Army at the start of 1812 is exhibited by the military failures in 
the first two years of the war.  The army needed to relearn the lessons that it had once learned 
during the Revolutionary War.  The defeats and losses in 1812 and 1813 eliminated the old semi-
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professional high ranking officers while giving experience to young promising officers.  These 
officers led America’s armies in 1814 and played a prominent role in the professionalization of 
the army in the post-war years. 
The fourth chapter examines the final year of the War of 1812 and the decades after.  
Propelled by the experience of the war, the army turns to professionalizing itself in the 1820s and 
1830s.  Officers, who experienced the defeats and confusion of the first two years of the war, 
now spur the army towards professionalization.  The army is given three decades of peace from 
major wars to implement these changes.   While there are no major wars during these decades, 
the army must defend the frontier and is engaged in several Indian wars that keep it busy and 
away from American society. 
The fifth chapter relates the Mexican War, whose results vindicate the professionalization 
of the American Army.  This was the first time since the War of 1812, that the American Army 
faced an army with a recognized government.  This aggressive war showcased the War of 1812 
generation, which led the new generation of West Point educated officers.  The greater portion of 
the junior officers, in the army at that time, were academy trained and helped lead the American 
forces to victories.  This war, contrasted with the War of 1812, highlighted the changes that had 
been made in the intervening decades.   
Prior to the American Revolution, the American colonies had relied solely on the citizen 
soldier for their defense.  By the time of the Mexican War in 1846, America had a small regular 
army filled with academy trained professional officers.  In the preceding six decades the 
American Army had transformed from militia based into a professional force.  This thesis 
stresses the importance of the War of 1812 as the driving force behind the professionalization of 
the American Army.  The results of this war highlighted the army’s unprepared state, and 
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propelled the American government to professionalize the small army.  This professionalization 
was spearheaded by career officers who had risen through the army’s ranks in the War of 1812.
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Chapter One: America’s Militia Heritage 
 In order to understand the American military in the late eighteenth century, it would be 
useful to trace the military tradition of the American colonies and their heritage prior to the 
American Revolution.  This heritage can be separated into two aspects; the militia heritage of 
seventeenth century England and the colonies’ own military traditions from the founding of the 
first permanent English settlement in 1607 to the American Revolution.   
The thirteen colonies that would become the United States of America were founded by 
European immigrants.  From the beginning all of these colonies were in the British Empire.1  
This was significant because Great Britain had a constitutional monarchy, which was a rare 
government in Europe at the time.  This style of government provided the colonists with a dual 
tradition of militia and armies.  England’s militia tradition stretched back to the Statute of 
Winchester in 1285, the Assize of Arms in 1181, and even earlier to the pre-Norman age.2  The 
clash between militias and standing armies within English society really heated up in the 
seventeenth century, exactly during the time of American colonization.  This is vital to the 
American sense of being because, immigrants would have taken this heritage with them to the 
New World.3 
The year 1628 is important because that is when King Charles I and Parliament first 
clashed over the military.  This would eventually lead to an argument over martial law and 
                                                          
1
 William Murray, “13 Originals Founding the American Colonies”, 
http://www.timepage.org/spl/13colony.html#mass (accessed 3/1/2012). 
2
 Lois G. Schwoerer, “No Standing Armies!” (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1974), 14. 
3
 Millet and Maslowski, 1; Kyle F. Zelner, A Rabble in Arms: Massachusetts Towns and Militiamen during 
King Philip’s War (New York: New York University Press, 2009), 28-29. 
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billeting of soldiers, both issues that concerned the colonists in 1775.4  In 1628, during the Thirty 
Years War, England was at war with France and Spain.  King Charles I of England needed 
money in order to carry on the war and, not winning the cooperation of Parliament, decided to 
pay for his army by his own means.  He prorogued Parliament and ruled without it.  A problem 
for Charles was that there were no army camps or a system of barracks in England.  Therefore 
the King had no alternative but to billet soldiers in public houses, inns, and private houses.  Lois 
Schwoerer mentions that homeowners who billeted soldiers would be reimbursed by the crown.  
It was only when payments became late that complaints began to mount.5  In answer to this 
Parliament issued the Petition of Right.  Schwoerer states that, “The Petition made it illegal for 
him to billet soldiers on unwilling subjects and to discipline the army in peacetime by martial 
law.”6  This time period and the Petition of Right “served as a precedent throughout the century 
in criticism of the army.”7 
In 1642, events developed that would lead to the English Civil War.  After more than a 
decade, King Charles reconvened Parliament in order to finance an army.  In 1642, Parliament 
passed the Militia Ordinance which transferred power over the militia from the King to 
Parliament.8  The King saw this as a direct affront to his royal prerogatives and eventually both 
sides went to war.  The English Civil War and the Militia Ordinance had a profound effect on 
colonial America because, “The idea that the legislature rather than the executive should have 
                                                          
4
 Schwoerer, 19-32.  This chapter reviews the year 1628 and the Petition of Right; See Allan I. Macinnes, 
The British Revolution, 1629-1660 (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005). 
5
 Schwoerer, 20-22. 
6
 Ibid., 32. 
7
 Ibid., 32. 
8
 Ibid., 33-50.  Also see Ian Gentles, The English Revolution: and the Wars in the Three Kingdoms 1638-
1652 (Harlow, England: Pearson Educated Limited, 2007). 
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ultimate control over the armed force of the nation became a central element in all future 
arguments.”9 
The next eventin the seventeenth century that affected American thinking on military 
issues was the advent of the New Model Army during the English Civil War.10  This army had 
been created in 1645 in order to defend Parliament and defeat the monarchy, and in turn, it set up 
the English Protectorate.  As Lois Schwoerer notes, “It was kept standing for fifteen years.  Thus, 
for the first time in its history, England directly experienced the effects of a large peacetime 
military establishment.”11  During these fifteen years, the army showed itself to be an instrument 
of political power.   
In 1647,factions in Parliament were attempting to affect a reconciliation with King 
Charles.  Aggressive members in the New Model Army, angry at the reconciliation attempt, led 
an army towards London.  From December 2nd to the 6th, 1648, troops under Colonel Thomas 
Pride purged the “Long Parliament”; three hundred and seventeen members of Parliament were 
arrested, excluded, or walked out.  The resultant “Rump Parliament”, minus the House of Lords, 
executed King Charles on January 30, 1649.12  This Parliament was then replaced in April 1653, 
due to tensions between it and the army.13  Finally in December 1653, Cromwell, with the 
backing of the army, formed the Protectorate and assumed supreme power in England, as the 
Lord High Protector.14  The Protectorate remained until May 8, 1660 when Charles II was 
crowned King.  The extent of the army’s influencefrom 1645 to 1660 had increased the 
population’s hatred and fear of a standing army.  “Basically, the Restoration of Charles II was a 
                                                          
9
 Schwoerer, 50. 
10
 Ian Gentles, The New Model Army (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992).   
11
 Schwoerer, 51. 
12
 Gentles, The New Model Army, 276-283; Macinnes, 188-189. 
13
 Macinnes, 202. 
14
 Ibid., 209. 
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repudiation of government by the sword and a test of how deeply Englishmen had come to 
dislike and distrust a professional military instrument.”15 
During the Interregnum the literature against standing armies began to pour forth.  An 
example of this was an article titled The Peaceable Militia which appeared in print anonymously 
in August 1648.  “I conceive that upon no pretence whatsoever, there ought to be kept or 
maintain’d any constant Army and Forces in the Kingdome.”16  This author stated that it was 
more important to “restrain and guard the Power (whatsoever it is, and in whomsoever it resides) 
which is exercisable over the Subjects of England,” than to dispute whether the King or 
Parliament should have control over the militia.17 
In 1654, following Oliver Cromwell’s elevation to Lord High Protector, a group of three 
colonels in the New Model Army wrote a petition to Cromwell.  Entitled The Humble Petition of 
Several Colonels of the Army, it argued against the military power that Cromwell wielded as 
Lord High Protector.  The three colonels stated that the army was formed to secure the rights and 
liberties of the nation, and not as a mercenary army.  Following the events of recent years they 
stated that, “A Standing Army…by the policy of any single person that shall succeed, [can] be 
made wholly Mercenary, and be made use of to destroy at his pleasure the being of 
Parliaments.”18  The colonels claimed that Cromwell was committing the same abuses of power 
that had led to war with the king.  Parliament alone had the power to raise money for an army, 
and a standing army could be a threat to freedom.19 
                                                          
15
 Schwoerer, 71. 
16
 The Peaceable Militia or The Cause and Cure of this late and Present Warre (London, 1648), 2 
[database on-line], Buffalo State College, E.H. Butler Library Research: accessed May 30, 2012. 
17
 Ibid., 2. 
18
 Colonel Thomas Saunders, To His Highness the Lord Protector, &c. and our General The Humble 
Petition of Several Colonels of the Army (London: S.N., 1654), 1 [database on-line], Buffalo State 
College, E.H. Butler Library Research: accessed May 30, 2012. 
19
 Ibid., 1. 
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In 1660, Charles II was crowned king, and the Restoration Period began.  During the 
three decades from 1660 to 1690 the anti-standing army sentiment ebbed and flowed.  During 
years of war the sentiment would naturally increase, but just as quickly would decrease once war 
ended and the army was disbanded.  Towards the late 1680s sentiment rose against Charles’ heir, 
James II, as some MPs believed he was creating a permanent standing army of his own.  More 
importantly, too many officer positions were being held by Catholics.  In 1689, James II was 
deposed and William III was pronounced king in the Glorious Revolution.20  This 
pronouncement was preceded by the Bill of Rights which the new king had to accept.  This 
document is important because, “Article vi asserted that it was ancient right and law that there 
should be no standing army in time of peace without Parliament’s consent.”21  The authority of 
the crown over military forces was not fully explored, but Parliamentary control of the army in 
peacetime was asserted.  The King could no longer raise as many troops as he liked in peacetime, 
without Parliament’s acceptance.   
The final important event, as it relates to eighteenth century American thought, happened 
at the end of the century.  During these years a most spirited debate unfolded over the idea of a 
standing army in England.  This was as a result of the Nine Years War being resolved in 1697 
with the Treaty of Ryswick.  The argument was not about Parliament’s authority over the army 
in peacetime, “but whether the king would accept Parliament’s decision on the size of the army 
and abide by it.”22  One faction in Parliament wanted the army’s strength cut to 6,500 while the 
King’s side wanted 30,000.  Both sides printed arguments for their cause, with John Trenchard 
and Andrew Fletcher the top advocates for one side and Daniel Defoe for the crown’s side.  John 
Trenchard, in an Argument Shewing that a Standing Army is Inconsistent with a Free 
                                                          
20
 Steve Pincus, 1688 The First Modern Revolution (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009). 
21
 Schwoerer, 151. 
22
 Ibid., 155. 
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Government, stated that, “than no Nation ever preserved its Liberty, that maintained an Army 
otherwise constituted within the Seat of their Government…”23  These arguments over the 
military influenced American colonists’ thinking.   
The seventeenth century was full of featured arguments over the evils of a standing army, 
and the virtues of the militia.  Trenchard’s pamphlets came out only eighty years before the 
American Revolution.  The English Civil War, the execution of King Charles I, and the New 
Model Army happened one hundred and thirty years before the American Revolution.  The vital 
point is that these events happened close to the American Revolution.  The colonists grew up 
with family stories, history education, and political references associated with these events.  
These events had an impact on the military culture of the American colonies.  For example, 
during the American Revolution, William Tudor delivered a speech in Boston warning against a 
military dictator that could arise if America won the war: 
We have known a people ruled by a despot, who, from a private station, rose to 
uncontrolled dominion, at a time when they were sternly virtuous.  And this mode of 
introducing bondage is ever to be apprehended at the close of a successful struggle for 
liberty, when a triumphant army, elated with victories, and headed by a popular general, 
may become more formidable than the tyrant that has been expelled.  Witness the last 
century in the English history! Witness the aspiring Cromwell!24 
 
When the first English colonists arrived at Jamestown in 1607 one of their first priorities 
was to establish a military in order to protect themselves.25  According to Millet and Maslowski, 
the new settlers in colonial America relied on professional soldiers at the outset, prominent 
                                                          
23
 John Trenchard, Argument Shewing that a Standing Army is Inconsistent with a Free Government 
(London: E. Whitlock, 1698), 8 [database on-line], Buffalo State College, E.H. Butler Library Research: 
accessed May 30, 2012. 
24
 William Tudor, Esq.  “Oration, Delivered at Boston, March 5, 1779,” in Anglo-American Antimilitary 
Tracts 1697-1830,  117. 
25
 Millet and Maslowski, 6. 
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examples being Captain John Smith in Jamestown and Miles Standish in Plymouth.26  These 
settlers had to defend themselves against Indians, pirates, and other European powers without 
much assistance from the home government.  This was due to several factors.  England did not 
possess a standing army, soldiers would take several weeks to cross the Atlantic Ocean, and the 
colonies were commercial ventures, not national enterprises.  Therefore one of the first things 
instituted in each settlement was a militia.  The average militia included all able bodied males 
from sixteen to sixty years old.  The basic unit in the militia was the company, or trained band.  
The militia was regularly trained in order to keep up a semblance of military precision.  This 
common militia was a force that was used in defense in an emergency invasion, but was not used 
in military expeditions.27 
Due to the nature of Indian warfare, attacks were usually unexpected.  Many times the 
militia could not be gathered in time to repel the first wave of an Indian attack.  To counter this 
problem, settlements constructed garrison houses, blockhouses, and stockades.  When an attack 
came, inhabitants would gather in the fortifications, with the militiamen at the loopholes.  The 
settlement would be looted and the food eaten or destroyed.  Yet Indians oftenlacked the military 
discipline to conduct siege operations, which meant that settlers could usually wait out the 
Indians in their fortifications.28  In the beginning of the colonial period, the common militia 
could not effectively defend its inhabitants and settlements.  According toMillet and Maslowski 
the militia was best utilized as a police force.  The militia could preserve the domestic peace, 
                                                          
26
 Millet and Maslowski, Introduction; Karr, Ronald Dale, ““Why Should You Be So Furious?”: The 
Violence of the Pequot War,” The Journal of American History, Vol. 85, No. 3 (December, 1998): 891. 
27
 Millet and Maslowski, 7. 
28
 Ibid., 6-7. 
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recover fugitive slaves and suppress slave insurrections in the South, and quell any movement 
against the established political order.29 
Once a settlement decided on mounting a military expedition against a foe, they would 
call out the volunteer militia.  These forces included volunteers, draftees, substitutes, and 
hirelings, and consisted of mostly lower class people.  This volunteer militia was assembled 
through militia district quotas.  Based on population, each district had to supply a certain number 
of men for a military expedition.  This allowed settlements to supply men, and still have enough 
manpower to tend to their crops.  Militia districts enticed volunteers with bounties, and if that 
failed they turned to drafts.30  The effect of this policy of common militia and volunteer militia 
led to a system that Kyle Zelner describes as, “a hybrid of the English system, with its two 
separate forces: untrained militia for offensive missions and trainbands for defense.31 
The members of this volunteer militia saw themselves as holding a legal contract between 
themselves and the authorities.32  Therefore if the objective was achieved, or the contract broken 
in their eyes, they felt no compunction about leaving or refusing to continue.  According to Fred 
Anderson, “Once made, the contract could not be altered by any human agency, although it could 
be destroyed.”33  This was legal to colonial soldiers, but unthinkable in European armies.34  An 
example of this practice took place in the French and Indian War.  In 1756 Massachusetts 
Governor William Shirley relinquished his position as acting commander in chief in North 
America.  He had planned to launch an invasion against the French held forts along Lake 
Champlain.  Shirley had stimulated militia conscription for an assault on Crown Point at the 
                                                          
29
 Millet and Maslowski, 7. 
30
 Ibid., 6-8. 
31
 Zelner, 29. 
32
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northern end of the lake by stating that the militia would only serve under their own commanders 
and only within a certain geographical area.  Various colonies responded by raising seven 
thousand militiamen under the command of John Winslow.  In late July Lord Loudoun arrived in 
New York to assume command over the military in North America.  As a professional soldier 
Loudoun attempted to force the militia under Winslow to submit to the regular army.  A series of 
letters went back and forth between Shirley, Winslow, and Loudoun.  Realizing that he could not 
obtain the objectives he wanted in North America without the cooperation of the militia, 
Loudoun reluctantly allowed the campaign to remain under Winslow’s authority.35  To the 
colonial militia, their legal contracts took priority over military efficiency and expediency.   
Militia officers, like colonial politicians, usually came from the upper class.  In 1636, 
Massachusetts’ militiamen began nominating their company officers.  This appalled the 
professional soldiers in the colony.  As prominent citizens in the community, upper class colonial 
persons held numerous officer positions.36  Yet contrasted with the British officer corps, there 
was still a good deal of social flexibility.  In the French and Indian War, over half of the 
Massachusetts militia company officers “identified themselves with manual occupations, and in 
fact followed the same livelihoods as private soldiers, although in different proportions.”37  
However, chances were that the higher grade the officer was, the higher his social status was.38  
Military and political offices were connected and it was not uncommon for a person to hold both 
offices at once.39  For example, in 1675, during King Philip’s War, a militia army was gathered 
in New England to attack the Narragansett tribe.  The commander of the inter-colonial army was 
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the Governor of Massachusetts Josiah Winslow, the grandfather of John Winslow.40  For 
colonials, the officers leading the militia were not necessarily the most militarily experienced 
individuals, but they were expected to have leadership ability and physical bravery.41 
In the seventeenth century, the American colonies concerned themselves with several 
Indian wars.  At the outset, the European settlers were fighting for their lives.  Unlike 
contemporary Europe, the settlers could not afford to engage in “Limited Warfare,” they had to 
fight for their existence.  As the century war on and the colonies grew larger, the Indians and 
colonists conducted an ever increasingly devastating type of warfare.  The colonists pushed for 
more land, while the Indians sought to stop them and push the colonists back to the coast.  The 
three wars that best exhibit this trend were the Tidewater Wars, the Pequot War, and King 
Philip’s War.   
In the first fifteen years of colonization in Virginia, the 1,100 English settlers had had 
peaceful relations with the neighboring Indians.  Peace had only been broken once, in 1617.42  
On Easter Sunday March 22, 1622 Indians raided white settlements in the Tidewater region of 
Virginia.  This unprovoked attack by the Tidewater Confederation was led by Opechancanough.  
Within hours the Indians had killed 25 percent of Virginia’s population.  In response, the 
colonists allied with the Potomac Indians and retaliated against Opechancanough.  This First 
Tidewater War lasted for ten years and ravaged the Virginia countryside.  In 1632 the governor 
signed a peace treaty with major tribes in the Tidewater Confederation.43 
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The peace between the Indians and the Virginians would not last.  Opechancanough 
launched another attack in 1644, killing five hundred people on the first day.  This time however, 
the Virginia colony had grown to a size of 8,000 people.  The white population was large enough 
to mount many more expeditions than previously.  This Second Tidewater War lasted only two 
years and ended with the capture of Opechancanough.  These two wars were the first full scale 
wars between Indians and the English colonists.  Indian tribes pounced on the early white 
settlements in order to destroy them, but were in turn destroyed a decade later.  These two wars 
transformed warfare between the Indians and the colonists into a war for survival.44 
This kind of unconditional warfare continued with the Pequot War in New England in 
1637.  In the early 1630s the Pequot tribe was the most powerful tribe in New England.  A 
complex series of events led them into war with the English colonists.  The major battle of the 
Pequot War was fought at a Pequot fort along the Mystic River.  Colonial troops commanded by 
Captain Underhill of Massachusetts and John Mason of Connecticut, accompanied by several 
hundred friendly Indians attacked the Pequot fort.  After a brief defense, the Pequots were 
overwhelmed, and the coalition of colonists and Indians killed most of the Pequots and burned 
their settlement.  This battle broke the back of the Pequot resistance and the survivors fled north 
to the Mohawk tribe.  The colonial troops followed the survivors, seeking the annihilation of the 
Pequot tribe.  The Mohawks captured the Pequot chief Sassacus and forty of his warriors.  The 
Pequot War reduced the once mighty Pequot nation to impotence.45 
A third example of this type of survival warfare was King Philip’s War in 1675.  King 
Philip was a chief of the Wampanoag Indians, a tribe friendly to the colonies.  By the 1670s the 
ever expanding colonies had transformed King Philip’s friendship to hostility.  In June 1675 
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Wampanoag Indians destroyed several buildings along the frontier.  Plymouth colonists 
mobilized to retaliate while the Wampanoags prepared to defend themselves.  The war 
intensified when the Nipmuck tribe joined Philip’s Wampanoags.  Colonists feared that other 
tribes might join Philip.46 
The colonists struck first, attacking the Narragansett tribe.  This tribe was the most 
powerful tribe in the area, and while it was a traditional enemy of the Wampanoags, many 
colonists saw their neutral stance as a threat.  In the Great Swamp Fight on December 19, 1675 
an inter-colonial army attacked a Narragansett village in Rhode Island’s Great Swamp.  The 
force was commanded by the governor of Plymouth Colony, Josiah Winslow, and comprised of 
1,000 men from Plymouth, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Indian allies.  The colonial army 
defeated the Narragansetts, burned their village and supplies, and drove the remaining survivors 
into the swamp.  A narrative of the battle was kept by a soldier who stated that: 
As soon as ever our Men had entred the Fort, the Indians fled, our Men killed many of 
them, as also of their Wives and Children…Our Men… had set fire to most of the 
Wigwams in and about the Fort…how many were burnt down they could not tell 
positively, only thus; That they Marched above three Miles from the Fort by the Light of 
the Fires.47 
 
The end of the war came when a colonial force under Benjamin Church, led by a Wampanoag 
turncoat, located Philip and killed him on August 12, 1676.48 
These three wars forever solidified the relationship between the colonists and the Indians.  
The colonies were on their own in the middle of a forbidding land surrounded by a different race 
of people who did not share their same culture and religious beliefs.  This might have made it 
easier to practice such aggressive warfare.  Ronald Karr believes that the colonists could engage 
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in this kind of total war because of the nature of Indian fighting.49  Conventional European 
warfare would happen when both sides in a war fought in that manner; fighting in the open, 
sparing prisoners and women and children.  Karr states that, “When soldiers were ordered to 
fight unconventional wars, such as wars of conquest and subjugation, guerrilla warfare, crusades 
against infidels, and putting down rebellions, they often left the rules of war behind.”50  In this 
first century of European colonization of America, the colonists learned to rely on the militia and 
gained confidence in fighting the Indians.  They learned to adapt to some guerilla type tactics 
that better suited warfare in the densely forested America, and if they did not, they learned to 
hire other Indian tribes to complement their European style tactics. 
An example of colonials imitating Indian tactics was the New England war hero 
Benjamin Church.  He had fought at the Great Swamp Fight against the Narragansett Indians in 
1675.  In 1676, he raised a volunteer company of Indians and whites to fight in Indian guerrilla 
tactics.  Church’s company was the most famous of the volunteer raiding units raised by 
Plymouth and Connecticut.  These companies were allowed to pursue the enemy without formal 
battle plans, thereby making them an effective raiding force.  It was Church’s force that found 
King Philip and killed him.51 
Starting from 1689, the American colonies began to fight European powers.52  During 
King William’s War (1689-1697) and Queen Anne’s War (1701-1713), the American colonies 
began to organize large military expeditions that included inter-colony cooperation.  These wars 
pitted England against its long time enemy France.  During King William’s War the most 
significant campaign happened in 1690.  An inter-colonial conference met in New York City, 
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attended by representatives from New York, Connecticut, Plymouth, and Massachusetts.  These 
colonies adopted a plan that would contain the hallmark of invading Canada for the next one 
hundred and thirty years.  An overland force would march from Albany to Lake Champlain and 
down the Richelieu River to Montreal.  In concert, a sea-borne force would move down the St. 
Lawrence River and attack Quebec.  These two cities were the heart of New France, and would 
later be the heart of British Canada.53 
The New York plan got off to a bad start.  The colonies raised fewer militiamen for the 
Montreal army than had been expected.  The Indian contingent as well was far smaller than was 
expected.  The Montreal campaign fizzled out when the militia/Indian force arrived at Lake 
Champlain.  The scarcity of boats, and a smallpox epidemic forced the commander to cancel the 
Montreal attack.  The 2,000 man Quebec force, under the command of Sir William Phips, arrived 
at Quebec in early October.  Quebec was a fortified city atop steep cliffs.  The Comte d’ 
Frontenac, New France’s governor, was able to reinforce Quebec’s fortifications when the 
Montreal invasion force turned back.  Phips put his force ashore, but was unable to make any 
headway against the French.  Depressed, Phips returned to New England with his troops.54 
The colonies made no more efforts on the scale of 1690 for the remaining seven years of 
the war.  The war turned into a series of raids.  French and Indian raiding parties attacked 
settlements and homes on the frontier.  The colonial militia was unable to defend the frontier, 
usually arriving too late to affect the course of the raid.  The colonies therefore sent out raiding 
parties of their own in retaliation.  The war finally came to an end in September 1697, when the 
European powers signed the Treaty of Ryswick.55 
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In 1702, war erupted again between France and England. This wasknownin North 
America as Queen Anne’s War.  The North American war was mainly between the Indians and 
the American colonists.  However several colonies (New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, and 
Pennsylvania) decided to strike Canada which they knew supplied the Indians with weapons.56  
In 1709, a plan to assault French Quebec and Montreal, much like that of 1690, was formulated. 
The plan was to send a militia army west and north to assault Montreal, and a force of British 
regulars to assault Quebec from the east.  In July an army of more than 1,500 militiamen from 
those four colonies, and several hundred Indians, gathered at Wood Creek near Lake Champlain, 
under the command of Colonel Francis Nicholson.  A 1,200 man army made up of New England 
militiamen gathered at Boston waiting for the British armada to transport it to the St. Lawrence 
River.  However in September, England canceled its part of the invasion.  This news reached the 
disgruntled militiamen in October, who returned to their homes.57 
Then again in 1711 the same plan was renewed.  In June a British fleet commanded by 
Sir Hovenden Walker arrived at Boston.  He would transport seven regular regiments and a 
marine battalion, under Brigadier General John Hill, and hundreds of New England militiamen 
by water into the St. Lawrence River and toward Quebec.  At the same time, Colonel Nicholson 
would again command the western army, now made up of more than 2,000 militiamen and 
Indians, and march against Montreal.  The plan went bad from the beginning.  There were more 
than 12,000 soldiers and sailors in Boston that had to be provisioned in anticipation of a long 
voyage.  The addition of Nicholson’s militiamen meant that, “the strength of the expedition 
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exceeded the total population of Boston and [its] vicinity, making a logistics crisis inevitable.”58  
The price of food in Boston gradually rose, defying military remonstrance and local government 
decree.  The British saw this as the colonials’ greed.  By the time that Walker sailed from Boston 
he had added, “three months’ supply of bread, beef, pork, and cheese to supplement what 
remained of the English rations.”59  These supplies however would not be able to feed his troops 
through the winter.  In addition to the supply problem was Walker’s difficulty in finding 
knowledgeable pilots for his fleet.  He had expected to find a number of good pilots, but instead 
found the pilots in Boston refuse to join his expedition.60 
Walker’s fleet of nine ships of war, two bomb vessels, and sixty transports carrying 7,500 
troops and marines, left Boston on July 30, 1711.  This time the British flotilla made it to the St. 
Lawrence River, where they ran into a storm in late August.  The flotilla lost a thousand men, 
seven transports, and one storeship.  On August 26, 1711, Walker called a council of war.  In his 
journal, Walker recorded, “That by reason of the Ignorance of the Pilots, it was wholly 
impracticable to go up the River of St. Laurence with the Men of War and Transports as far as 
Quebec…”61  Walker decided to return to Boston, but called one last council of war on 
September 8.  After taking into account, “the shortness of our Provisions, the Uncertainty and 
Difficulty of being supply’d…the unanimous Result was…we should return to Great Britain 
with the Ships and Forces that came from thence, and the New England Troops and Vessels to 
Boston.”62  Nicholson’s army had been marching northward towards Montreal when it was called 
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back.  Nicholson, angered at the canceled invasion, marched his troops back to Albany and 
dispersed them.63 
Both the 1709 and 1711 invasions led the colonists to harbor hard feelings against the 
British regulars and the government.The colonies had gone to great expense to raise the militia 
armies, only to have England cancel the invasions.  In 1713, France and England signed the 
Treaty of Utrecht which would usher in twenty-five years of peace between the two nations.64 
The feeling of distrust toward the mother government was reinforced during King 
George’s War (1744-1748) in which Great Britain was once again at war with the French.  In 
1745 Massachusetts Governor William Shirley proposed a colonial attack on the French held 
fortress of Louisbourg.  Louisbourg commanded the mouth of the St. Lawrence River and hence 
the naval supply lines to Quebec and Montreal.  William Pepperrell commanded a 4,000 man 
New England militia army.  This army, with the aid of a British fleet, succeeded in capturing 
Louisbourg after a seven week siege.  The taking of Louisbourg was the most noted action of the 
war.  Yet at the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, Great Britaingave up Louisbourg in return for 
the French withdrawal from Flanders on the European Continent.  The fact that England gave up 
a fortress taken by the American militia, only deepened the resentment of the colonies 
towardsthe British government and military.  Colonists thought that the mother government 
disregarded their own sacrifices and had sacrificed their own security.65 
The most important colonial war, before the American Revolution, was the French and 
Indian War (1754-1765).66  In this war massive numbers of British regulars were sent to the 
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American colonies.  Thefailures and loss of life in the first three years of the warreinforced, in 
the minds of the colonists, the ineffectiveness of professional soldiers.  Two examples of this 
would be the Battle of the Monongahela River in 1755 and the Battle of Fort Ticonderoga in 
1758.  In 1755, the British ministry had selected to attack four positions that would cripple the 
French in North America.  These positions were Fort Duquesne (Pittsburgh), Niagara, Crown 
Point (at the southern end of Lake Champlain), and Fort Beausejour.  In 1755, a regular/militia 
force under Major General Edward Braddock headed towards Fort Duquesne.  However on July 
9 near the Monongahela River, the army was ambushed by a French and Indian force.  The 
advance guard of Braddock’s army fell back on his main force causing great confusion.  The 
French and Indian army remained hidden in the forest firing at the British army until Braddock 
was killed and his army fled from the battlefield.67 
In 1757, the French commander in Canada, theMarquis de Montcalm, marched from Fort 
Ticonderoga on Lake Champlain and attacked the British Fort William Henry at the southern end 
of Lake George.  After a siege the British surrendered the fort to Montcalm who burned it, and 
returned to Ticonderoga.  In the following year the British began a renewed war effort in North 
America, under the leadership of the British Prime Minister William Pitt.  An army of more than 
12,000 British regulars and colonial troops commanded by the British commander in chief in 
North America, James Abercromby, labored towards Fort Ticonderoga.  Montcalm had fewer 
than 4,000 soldiers at Ticonderoga, but he had constructed extensive fortifications.  On July 8, 
1758, Abercromby hurled his soldiers at Montcalm’s fortifications.  For four hours the British 
and colonial troops assaulted the French until finally Abercromby called a halt.  The British had 
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lost more than 1,600 regulars and 300 colonials.  The unnerved British commander withdrew his 
troops from Fort Ticonderoga.68 
Despite the British setback at Ticonderoga, British armies did succeed in capturing 
Louisbourg, Fort Duquesne, and destroying Fort Frontenac on the St. Lawrence River.  In the 
following year British armies took Fort Ticonderoga, Fort Niagara, and in a famous campaign 
took Quebec.  In 1760 Montreal capitulated to the British which effectively ended the war in 
North America.69 
An event happened in 1754 that would set a precedent for the American colonies in the 
coming decades.  In 1754, seven colonies sent representatives to Albany to discuss defense 
problems and to entice the Six Nations of the Iroquois to ally with the British.  In 1753, the 
British secretary of state charged with North America urged the colonies to support each other 
against any invasions.  The Albany Conference proposed a Plan of Union calling for united 
action in defense matters.  This was not a particularly new idea.  As early as 1643 Massachusetts 
Bay, Plymouth, Connecticut, and New Haven had formed the New England Confederation to 
provide for mutual defense.  The representatives took the Plan of Union back to their respective 
colonies (Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, Maryland, 
and New York); however no colonial assembly approved the plan.70  The Plan of Union called 
for a general government in America that allowed the colonies to protect one another.  A 
crowned appointed president-general would administer the government.  He would be supported 
by a grand council of forty-eight representatives elected by the assemblies of the individual 
                                                          
68
 Anderson, The Crucible of War, 240-249. 
69
 Millet and Maslowski, 39-41. 
70
 Anderson, The Crucible of War, 77-85. 
27 
 
colonies.  Although the Plan of Union was rejected by the colonial legislatures, the Albany 
Conference was a step towards the Continental Congress in the following decades.71 
Millet and Maslowski contend that the American colonies had a habit of downplaying the 
role of the British regulars.  “Colonists typically emphasized British defeats and insufficiently 
praised the triumphs of Amherst, Forbes, and Wolfe.  Such attitudes were a tribute to the 
colonists’ selective military memory and help explain colonial confidence in 1775.”72  The 
French and Indian War gave the colonies even more confidence in the militia as opposed to a 
regular army.  Furthermore the oppressive, in colonial eyes, demands of the British commanders, 
which included quartering and supplying, gave the colonies even more of a reason to distrust a 
standing army.  Lastly the Albany Conference of 1754 advanced the idea that the colonies could 
work together for their own safety, which was juxtaposed to the decreasing confidence and 
estranged thoughts toward the Mother Country.73 
On the eve of the American Revolution, the American colonies had survived and fought 
on the continent for over one and a half centuries.  In the seventeenth century, the colonies had 
learned to protect themselves and wage wars of extermination with the Indian tribes adjacent to 
them.  In the late seventeenth and into the eighteenth centuries the colonies began relying on 
volunteer militia to conduct military expeditions against the Indians and then the French.  The 
colonies’ reliance on militia was due to many factors, including the rough geography of the New 
World, the lack of a sufficient economic infrastructure to support an army, and the anti-standing 
army heritage that flowed from seventeenth century England.  The presence of a regular army in 
the American colonies, along with British defeats, had reinforced the already imbedded notion of 
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a fear of standing armies.  All of these factors influenced colonial views of military forces prior 
to the American Revolution.74 
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Chapter 2: The United States Army in the Napoleonic Era 
 
Leading up to the American Revolution, the most pressing example of a professional 
eighteenth century European army was the Prussian Army of King Frederick II.  This army came 
to prominence during the Seven Years War and was the most exalted army at the time.1  The key 
to Prussian military success was the drill and discipline that was hammered into its soldiers.  
European armies in the eighteenth century were small (compared with the armies in the 
Napoleonic Era), constantly drilled, and separated from society.  The army was an autonomous 
unit within the state.  Officers were from aristocratic families and the soldiers were mostly from 
poor ones.2  Warfare of the eighteenth century demanded uniformity and constant drill.  The 
Prussian Army stood out as the most drilled army of this time period.  As Geoffrey Best notes, 
“Frederick’s armies had done well by arriving at the battlefield in good order and by maintaining 
a high order of disciplined efficiency through the basic business of maneuvering and firing.”3 
Drilling was essential because of the type of warfare that European armies practiced, 
which was known as linear warfare.  Linear warfare in the eighteenth century comprised two 
armies facing each other with compact, neat, orderly lines.  These lines were two to three men 
deep shoulder to shoulder.  The opposing armies stood 50-100 yards from each other using mass 
volleys in order to tear great holes in the enemy’s line.  Linear warfare was a response to the 
limitation of the weapons of the time.  In the best situation the smoothbore musket, the main 
infantry weapon, could load 2-3 times a minute.  Yet during battle, confusion and panic could 
greatly reduce this efficiency.  Furthermore muskets were only accurate at very close distances, 
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perhaps fifty yards.  Linear tactics used massed firepower in order to assure damage to the 
enemy.  Compact linear lines also enabled the officers and NCO’s to observe their soldiers.4  
Drill was essential to any army in any period, but especially to the eighteenth century army.  
Constant practice of repetitive motions and movements broke down individuality and replaced it 
with the instinct to obey.  Paul Lockhart states that, “Thought was a tactical liability, for thought 
and emotion could induce panic in stressful situations.”5  Once panic set in, a soldier might 
discharge his weapon prematurely, run for cover, or flee.  This panic could quickly spread 
throughout an army.  It was the officer’s duty to instill the instinct to follow orders, so that when 
the horrors of battle occurred the soldiers would maintain discipline.6  Therefore professional 
officers who understood drill, relentlessly pursued it, and maintained order in the ranks, were 
essential to an army.  These were the kind of officers that the Continental Army was deficient in 
during the first few years of the American Revolution.7  John Adams stated to Henry Knox in 
1776: 
The true cause of the want of good officers in the army is not because the appointment is 
left to the assemblies, but because such officers in sufficient numbers are not in 
America…Time, study, and experience alone must make a sufficient number of able 
officers.8 
 
In addition to drill, flexibility was another hallmark of the Prussian army.  Constant drill 
enabled an army to turn direction quicker and with more cohesion than their counterparts.  This 
flexibility enabled Frederick to perform his most utilized tactic, the flank attack.  Robert Citino 
argues that the legacy of Frederick II was his aggressive operations, short campaigns, heavier 
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emphasis on cavalry tactics, and most importantly operational movement (out of sight 
movement).9  Frederick’s most utilized tactic was to fall on his enemy’s flank prior to 
engagement.  This was most fully shown at the battle of Leuthen in 1757.  The Prussians were 
outnumbered two-to-one by the Austrian army.  While a diversionary force attacked the Austrian 
front, Frederick’s main force marched to the right behind a line of hills.  Once clear of the hills, 
the Prussian army wheeled left, attacked, and rolled up the Austrian left flank.  This victory 
against a superior foe encapsulated Frederick’s plan of operational movement.10  Napoleon 
would utilize this tactic in his battles fifty years later.  The Seven Years War was a war of 
survival for the Prussian state.  The existence and success of the Prussian Army in the Seven 
Years War against Russia, France, and Austria; lifted the Prussian Army up as the model of 
eighteenth century professionalism.   
 A second example of a professional army in the eighteenth century was the British Army.  
The British Army was an important source of emulation because the American colonies were 
British.  Furthermore many of the citizens and leaders of the Continental Army had been familiar 
or had worked alongside the British Army during the French and Indian War.  In terms of drill 
and tactics, the British Army emulated the Prussian.  The British had translated many foreign 
military texts into English including Marshal Saxe of France’s Reveries and Frederick the 
Great’s Prussian Field Regulations.11  The difference between the British and the Prussian 
armies was most noticeable in relation to the officer corps.  The British officer corps was based 
on purchasing commissions.  According to Best, in the British Army “every rank, from ensign up 
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to colonel, had a cash label on it, and a quasi-official little branch of military bureaucracy 
established itself for the convenient negotiation of sales and purchases.”12  The Prussian officer 
corps was more militarized than the British and, due to a lack of money in the state, prized 
military distinction over monetary gain.13  Certainly there were plenty of British officers who 
were professional, but there were also quite a few who knew nothing about the army.  The 
British purchasing system also made it more difficult for talented young officers to rise in the 
ranks quickly.14 
 In the American Revolution the mainstay of the British Army was the infantry.  These 
were professional lifelong soldiers.  The British utilized line infantry, as well as light infantry 
and grenadiers.  Light infantry would be used as skirmishers, advance guards, and for 
reconnaissance.  Grenadiers were big men and were used as a shock force in combat.  An 
important component of the British attack was the bayonet charge.  After firing a volley the 
infantry would rush towards the enemy with fixed bayonets.  This was the tactic that so 
frightened the undisciplined American troops.15  The British also relied on auxiliaries such as the 
loyalists and Indians to complement their troops.  They devised several quick striking cavalry 
and light infantry forces; the most notable of which was Tarleton’s Legion.  The British army 
still predominantly favored European style open battles, which were less frequent in North 
American fighting.  Yet the British could also utilize unconventional European warfare against 
the Americans.16 
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 On April 19, 1775, American militia and British Regulars clashed at the Battles of 
Lexington and Concord.  Two months later, a British army and an American militia army met at 
the Battle of Bunker Hill.17  These events marked the beginning of the American Revolutionary 
War.  However, the American Revolution does not mark the beginning of the American Army.  
This would officially begin in 1784.  Rather the Continental Army served as the example and 
forerunner to the American Army.  On July 2, 1775, George Washington took command of the 
Continental Army surrounding Boston.18  This war began what Millet and Maslowski term the 
“dual army tradition” in the American military.19  This entailed a very large partially trained 
militia combined with a small core of experienced regulars.  These two entities would, for most 
of the American armies in the war, work in tandem with each other. 
 The militia was organized and their terms of enlistment were processed by each state.  
The enlistment term of a militiaman was generally short, from weeks to a few months.20  
Supposedly, the militia cut back expenses for the Continental Congress and the states by each 
individual providing his own clothes and firearm.21  Yet there are several instances where militia 
units requested firearms.22  While militia would generally bring their own firearms, food still had 
to be provided by the army.  Furthermore, while militiamen were in the army they could not tend 
to their crops, which could mean less food for the army.  Once their enlistments were up, the 
militiamen would return to their farms.23  Militiamen were called up to defend their region, and 
would return home once they felt that their contract had been fulfilled.  Militiamen could arrive 
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in great quantities but this was offset by their short enlistment, lack of battlefield training and 
experience, and tendency to return to their homes at inopportune times for the commanders.24 
The American militia had a wide ranging level of performance in the American 
Revolution.  They performed very well in some battles and very poorly in other ones.  At the 
Battle of Bunker Hill on June 17, 1775 the militia performed very well versus British regulars.25  
The American militia force was made up of several different state militias stretching across the 
Charlestown Peninsula in Boston Harbor.  The British regulars assaulted the American line three 
times, before they were finally able to force the Americans to retreat.  The American militia was 
able to hold the British in check for most of the day, due to the expertise of their officers who 
included, General Israel Putnam, William Prescott, Artemis Ward, and John Stark.  These 
officers had gained experience in the French and Indian War, and they taught the militia how to 
fire in controlled volleys.  The performance of the militia at Bunker Hill stands in contrast to the 
battle of Camden in August 16, 1780.  General Horatio Gates with 3,000 men was defeated by 
the British General Cornwallis with 2,000.  Gates’ militia constituted two thirds of his army.  In 
this battle, Gates positioned his troops in open ground with the militia on the left and center and 
the regulars on the right.  The British lined up opposite and charged the Americans with 
bayonets.  The American militia promptly fled.  The American regulars fought bravely with the 
British for over an hour, but were also eventually routed.26 
There are a variety of reasons for the varying performances of the militia throughout the 
war.  The first was the ability and overall combat readiness of the militia.  In the beginning of the 
war, most of the militiamen were inexperienced in battle.  Therefore when they faced off against 
British regulars in open ground, they would mostly turn and flee.  Towards the end of the war, 
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many militia units could be composed of discharged Continentals.  For example, at the Battle of 
Cowpens on January 17, 1781, the Virginia militia was composed of discharged Continentals.  
Rather than putting these men in the front line with the inexperienced militia, the American 
General Daniel Morgan placed these Virginians alongside his regulars where they proceeded to 
stand in the open field against charge after charge of British infantry.27 
A second reason for the varying performance of the militia in the war was how the militia 
was used.  According to Matthew Ward, the militia was most effective in policing the 
countryside.28  Correlli Barnett claims that loyalists were suppressed everywhere except under 
the immediate shield of a British army.  The militia was therefore very effective in persecuting 
perceived waverers.29  The militia could fight very well in defense of their homes, quelling 
Loyalist sentiment, putting down servile insurrections, and gathering supplies.  It was when the 
militia was used in open battle that it had to be handled carefully.   
Unlike the regulars, militia for the most part did not have bayonets, or were not schooled 
in the use of the bayonet.  This, combined with the lack of ideal training, is the main reason why 
militias were not strong enough to fight the British infantry in the open field.  Once the British 
leveled their bayonets and charged, the militia would run.  This was prevalent in most 
Revolutionary War battles, unless the militia was commanded by experienced commanders, such 
as at the Battle of Bunker Hill.  The militia was much better being used as auxiliaries.  Militia 
could be used to harry an opponent, hit the flanks, and skirmish.30  This was the kind of warfare 
that Americans were used to with the Indians.  From 1777 until 1781 Washington used mobile 
militia raiding parties to continually harass British outposts in New Jersey and New York.  “Here 
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the militia had distinct advantages over regular troops.  Rotating parties of militia could remain 
on constant duty, and the militiamen knew the roads and byways through the woods and could 
intercept any farmer attempting to sell produce to the British.”31  All of these actions stress the 
hit and run aspect of the militia, as opposed to European linear tactics. 
The third aspect that determined the militia’s performance was the ability of the 
commander.32  The American commanders at Bunker Hill held the British at bay because they 
restrained the militia’s tendency to fire earlyby stressing fire by volley.33  At the Battle of 
Cowpens, Daniel Morgan effectively used his militia by incorporating a series of tactics.  
Morgan understood the militia’s tendency to run away from an advancing line of British 
bayonets.  To combat this urge, Morgan first set his army in front of a river, thereby preventing 
the militia from retreating from the battlefield.  Second, Morgan put the militia in the front of his 
army.  He told the militia to fire twice and then run behind the Continentals.  This allowed the 
militia to inflict some damage while not forcing them to stand and trade volleys with the British 
regulars.  This tactic convinced the British commander that the American army was retreating.  
The British regulars charged right into the muzzles of the Continentals, who halted the British 
charge.  Lastly, Morgan was able to reform the militia and use them to flank the final British 
assault.34  The result was a conclusive victory for the Americans.  This instance of militia 
performing linear tactics well against British regulars was the exception to the rule in the 
American Revolution.  The militia performed very well under men such as Daniel Morgan, John 
Stark, and Baron von Steuben.  Put under less capable leaders such as Horatio Gates and the 
militia performed badly.   
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The regular, or Continental regiment, was requested by Congress and raised by each 
state.  The advantage of the Continental soldier was that he was a longer term soldier.  An 
enlistment term for the Continental could be one year or longer.  The Continental was issued 
whichever type of flintlock musket that Congress could acquire.35  This allowed him to have and 
be trained in the use of a bayonet.  The enlistment term of the Continental allowed the army 
commander the opportunity to drill and train the soldier to counter the British opponent.   
 The American regulars fought the British Army using linear tactics.  During the first two 
years of the war the regulars fought with bravery and distinction.  However the regulars lacked 
the ability to maneuver and change formation quickly and the restraint needed to deliver 
coordinated devastating volleys of musketry.36  At the Battle of Brandywine on September 11, 
1777, the American army was situated along the Brandywine creek.  The British army under 
General Howe was on the opposite side of the creek.  Howe left a holding force in front of the 
American army and took the main portion of his army around the American right flank.  Once 
Washington realized this had happened he refused his right flank (brought his right flank back 90 
degrees).  The British fell upon Washington’s right flank and broke it.  Yet the division under 
General Nathaniel Greene was able to conduct a fighting withdraw which kept the British from 
pursuing.  In this battle the American regulars were able to fight with the British regulars for 
some time, but the maneuverability and firepower of the British infantry on the field of battle 
was too much for the Americans.37 
There was also one more unit that has been famed in American military tradition, the 
rifleman.  According to Wood, less than three percent of the American military in the American 
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Revolution was made up of rifleman.38  Riflemen carried the Kentucky long rifle, which had 
much improved accuracy over the musket of the eighteenth century, with one disadvantage being 
that it could not be fitted with a bayonet.  Riflemen were light infantry who would be used as 
skirmishers and snipers, and could not engage in hand to hand fighting with the British.39 
The turning point of the war for the Continental Army was the winter at Valley Forge, 
when a Prussian captain named Friedrich Wilhelm August Heinrich Ferdinand von Steuben 
entered the American camp.  Up to this point each Continental regiment had trained according to 
the practices favored by its commanding officer.  It remained to the individual officer in what 
manner and how much he would train his soldiers.  Anthony Wayne, for instance, was noted for 
his training.40  Wayne severely punished soldiers who breached military regulations.  Paul David 
Nelson states that, “Deserters were handled with special severity, and six of them in less than 
three months received between fifteen and thirty-nine lashes each.”41  Wayne extensively read 
military texts and practiced the concepts he learned.  At Valley Forge he had his men drill twice 
a day.  His soldiers were some of the best trained of Washington’s soldiers.  This was exhibited 
on the night of July 16, 1779, when Wayne led a bayonet attack against the British fort at Stoney 
Point.  Wayne’s force killed, wounded, or captured almost seven hundred men, at a cost of one 
hundred.42 
The major problem for the Continental Army was not the lack of drill, but that it did not 
have a universal system of training.  It seems that the only aspect in which the army was mostly 
unified in was drilling in the use of the musket according to the British military manual, 
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Regulations of 1764.43  From mid-March to May 1778, Steuben focused the training of the 
Continental Army in marching.  Steuben based this on the Prussian mode of training.  The 
Continental Army was taught the Prussian 75 step a minute pace, how to march quick step (120 
steps a minute), to march obliquely, to turn, to fire and advance, and to fire and retreat.  He 
began with a 150 man model company and then disseminated his teachings throughout the 
Army.  By the beginning of May the Continental Army was able to host a Grand Review in 
which the whole army marched and performed maneuvers.44  What Steuben instilled in the 
Continental Army was a sense of pride, how to maneuver quickly on the battlefield, and how to 
march and fire in unison.  This was showcased at the Battle of Monmouth on June 8, 1778.45 
In the Battle of Monmouth the American advance force attacked a superior British army 
at Monmouth Court House in New Jersey.  After some fighting, the British pushed the 
Americans from the field.  Normally this would have resulted in a disaster, yet once General 
Washington and the main army marched up, the retreating units were able to reform and check 
the British advance.  The two armies slugged it out the entire day, and towards the end of the 
day, the American army was starting to push the British back.  It was only the setting of the sun 
that prevented a resolution to the conflict.  The Battle of Monmouth was a tactical draw.  The 
importance of the battle was not the leadership of the American army, but how the army was able 
to reform, maneuver, and trade volley for volley with a victorious British army.46 
Steuben’s drilling did not promise that the Continental Army could defeat the British.  It 
did give Washington confidence to engage in smaller engagements such as the Battle of Stony 
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Point, and Springfield.47  Valley Forge gave the Continental Army a uniform style of drilling; a 
sense of professionalism, and it educated the young field officers.  Many of these young officers 
would be officers in the American Army after the American Revolution.  The system of training 
at Valley Forge was reflected on and emulated later in the early national period.48 
Baron von Steuben’s impact was also felt in another way.  In 1779, he wrote a military 
manual entitled the Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States, 
more commonly known as the Blue Book.  The 150 page book was divided into three parts; a 
drill manual, regulations for military conduct, and the duties of all ranks in the army.  The Blue 
Book was a military manual stripped of ostentatious formations and focused on basic 
instructions.  This was ideal for the amateur officers in the Continental Army.49  This manual 
served as an instructional booklet for army officers all the way up to and through the War of 
1812.50 
The Continental Army blended the military practices of Europe with its own style of 
military tradition grown out of their nearly two hundred year existence in North America.  For 
certain the British Army was a factor in the modeling of the Continental Army.  In the early part 
of the war the American units were trained with the British Regulations of 1764.51  Baron von 
Steuben complained about the American officer’s reluctance to personally train his troops, 
leaving that duty to the NCO.  He claimed this was a leftover from the British officer tradition.52  
While the American military allowed for a greater degree of social variety in the Continental 
officer corps, Washington was still insistent that officers be gentlemen.  This idea was the 
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prevalent thought in the eighteenth century.  Skelton asserts that, “Officers were to be gentlemen 
whose social standing would reinforce their military rank.”53  In these ways the Continental 
Army continued to observe Old World conventions. 
Baron von Steuben contributed a Prussian aspect to the Continental Army.  What he did 
in formulating his own regulations book was to discard all of the ostentatious unnecessary 
movements in the Prussian drill.54  Steuben showed the American officer how to care for his 
troops and also how to retain a certain amount of military decorum.  A problem the Continental 
Army had was the militia tradition of electing their company officers.  This led many of the 
officers to fraternize freely with their soldiers.  Steuben tried to combat this democratic urge by 
maintaining that soldiers not speak to officers unless asked to do so.55  The most telling example 
of the Prussian drill instilled in the army occurred in October 1782.  The French army under the 
Count de Rochambeau was marching from toward Boston to sail back to France.  On the way, 
the French stopped to observe a Grand Review of the Continental Army.  During the procession 
Rochambeau proclaimed that the American soldiers drilled like Prussians.56 
The high commanders in the Continental Army had also read or were aware of 
contemporary European military books.  In a letter to his brother in 1755, George Washington 
included an invoice of goods to be shipped to Mount Vernon.  Among the items was Humphrey 
Bland’s 1727 treatise on Military Discipline.57  Henry Knox had been a bookseller before the 
Revolution, and had read many military works.  In 1776, John Adams inquired after Henry 
Knox’s opinion on what works Congress should recommend to the American officer corps.  
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Knox responded with works by various eighteenth century authors.  Knox mentioned that 
Marshal Saxe, “had done more towards reducing war to fix’d principles than perhaps any other 
man of the age.”58  Most books had to be shipped over from England, but some were also printed 
in America.  “At least five Boston editions and two New York abstracts of Bland's Treatise of 
Military Discipline appeared before 1756; in 1757, two New York editions of the Prussian short 
field exercises appeared. Between 1766 and 1780, no fewer than twenty-six American imprints 
of the official 1764 Manual Exercise, As Ordered by His Majesty spewed from presses in eight 
of the thirteen colonies.”59 
Besides the colonial officers, there were also numerous European officers who had 
firsthand experience in European warfare and were familiar with current military works.  Horatio 
Gates, Charles Lee, and Richard Montgomery had fought in the British Army, and Baron von 
Steuben and Baron de Kalb had fought with the Prussians.60  Many of these officers as well as 
other American officers had a wide variety of military works and could read many different 
languages.  Charles Lee could read several languages and had an extensive library.  “Charles 
Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, having studied the classics in England and the art of war 
in Caen, France, knew Latin, Greek, and French.”61  There were American generals who knew 
about current military works and methods.  The lack of military centralization, a long army 
history, and available English editions of military works hampered the Continental Army. 
Furthermore regimental and company grade officers had to become thoroughly professional in 
order to affect a difference.  It took a few years for these officers to be able to gain enough 
experience to professionalize the Continental Army. 
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The Continental Army also had many American aspects to it.  In many instances 
promotion was based on military ability.  The contemporary European officer corps was based 
on social status.  In the Continental Army, officers could come from the landed gentry, ex-
officers, or from other areas of society.  For example, Benedict Arnold was a merchant, Daniel 
Morgan was a frontiersman, Nathaniel Greene was a Quaker farmer, and Henry Knox was a 
bookseller.  All of these men became generals in the Continental Army due to their abilities.  
This aspect highlighted America’s deficiency in professionalism, but also allowed for upward 
mobility.  
Another American aspect of the Continental Army was the extent of the dual army 
tradition.  At times the militia could be very effective.  For example during the Southern 
Campaign in 1780, a militia army surrounded an army of British Loyalists and destroyed them at 
the Battle of King’s Mountain.62  They then proceeded to disband and go back to their homes.  
The rifleman was a uniquely American force.  Riflemen were used with great efficiency in 
harassing British armies.  Commanders such as Nathaniel Greene, Daniel Morgan, and John 
Stark used unconventional tactics in order to defeat the British.  These men used linear tactics 
when they had to but, perhaps due to circumstances, incorporated the militia and riflemen to 
harass the British.  The dense American forests and swamps, in which linear tactics were of little 
use, allowed for hit and run tactics.  One such example is in North and South Carolina in 1780 
and 1781.  General Greene out of necessity divided his army into several parts.  Greene could 
feed his army much more readily with several detachments.  Russell Weigley asserts that, “By 
violating the principle of concentration, Greene tempted Cornwallis to violate it also, and thus he 
might make the British army still more vulnerable to partisan harassment and to encounters with 
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his own force…”63  Greene used the partisan militia bands in the area to protect his force and to 
continually harass the larger British army, by using the swamps and forests as protection. 
The Continental Army in the American Revolution did not begin as a professional army.  
Throughout the war it could be classified as a semi-professional army.  There are two aspects 
that hindered the professionalization of the Continental Army, the anti-army sentiment and the 
democratic fracturing of authority.  The long tradition of anti-standing army sentiment 
manifested itself in many ways.  First, militiamen were raised far more easily and numerously to 
the detriment of the Continental regiments.  The militia formed on a short term basis which 
allowed for quick actions and eliminated the need for the rigors of regular army life.64  The anti-
army sentiment also hindered military institutions and quantities of translated military books 
from forming in the colonies.  While there were a few general officers who had fought in the 
French and Indian War, most of the line officers for the Continental Army were untrained.65  
Worse than that there were no military regulations or academies in North America.  That is why 
the issuing of a universal drill manual by Steuben was so profound for the Continental Army.  It 
allowed the line officers of the entire army to train their men in a standard way.   
The democratic system in the Continental Congress led to several problems with the 
army.  The root of the problems was the fact that each state jealously guarded its rights.  An 
example of this was in 1775 when Congress formed the Continental Army.  Congress 
commissioned one general (George Washington), two major generals (Artemis Ward and 
Charles Lee), and one adjutant general (Horatio Gates).  This angered the other colonies because 
Washington, Lee, and Gates were all from Virginia.  In response Congress commissioned Philip 
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Schuyler, from New York, as the third major general.  The brigadier generals were divided 
among the colonies: three for Massachusetts, two for Connecticut, and one each for New York, 
New Hampshire, and Rhode Island.66 
In 1777, the Continental Army was estimated to reach a strength of 60,000 men.  This 
necessitated the commissioning of more major generals.  Congress could not decide on the 
method of promotion.  Francis Lewis wrote back to New York, “Colonial prejudices sway the 
minds of individuals that each state appear interested in the debates, for promotion in the line of 
their respective State[s].”67  Two methods proposed were promotion on the basis of seniority, or 
promotion proportionate to the number of soldiers furnished by each state. 
Maryland, Virginia, and North Carolina desired that each State should recommend 
officers in proportion to the men they furnish…This was rejected.  It was then proposed 
to promote General officers as they stood in rank, and rejected.68 
 
If seniority was the method in which general officers were promoted, then the states who were 
late in raising troops would have a greater proportion of junior officers.  If officers were 
promoted on the basis of the number of troops a state furnished, then able senior generals from 
states who contributed fewer soldiers would be passed over.  The high sense of honor held by 
officers of this period meant that it was likely they would resign if they were passed over for 
promotion.69  General Daniel Morgan, who was passed over for command, retired and went back 
to his farm in 1779.  He was reinstated and promoted right before the crucial Battle of 
Cowpens.70 
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The solution that Congress adopted was to consider the officer’s time in the grade, merit, 
and equity among state lines.  However, state politics still played a role in the promotion process.  
In February 1777 four Connecticut brigadier generals were passed over for promotion to major 
general.  One of these was Benedict Arnold who had outranked five of the recently promoted 
generals.  Roger Sherman wrote back to the Governor of Connecticut the reason for Congress’ 
decision was, “that Connecticut had more general officers than in the proportion to the number of 
troops furnished by the State…”71  Benjamin Lincoln, a militia officer, was one of those men 
who was promoted to major general over Arnold.  The fact that a militia officer was promoted to 
major general in the Continental Army over the heads of several experienced brigadier generals, 
angered many officers.72  The states’ jealous protection of their interests affected the overall 
effectiveness of the Continental Army.  This method of promotion hampered the rise of talented 
commanders and bred, “dissatisfaction among many of the officers who felt they were unjustly 
passed over…”73 
The fact that the Continental Congress was not very powerful also hindered the growth of 
professionalism.  Congress did not have the authority to tax or to force the individual states to do 
anything.  This inability added to the rampant inflation that followed the printing of Continental 
paper money led to the conclusion that by the end of the war the soldiers’ pay was many months 
if not years in arrears.74  In January 1776, Congress began recruiting Continental regiments, and 
in September it authorized eighty eight Continental regiments to be raised.75  Yet it was up to the 
individual states to raise both the Continental regiments and the militia.  This, combined with the 
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lack of a good road system and cooperation of the states, made transportation of supplies very 
slow.76  In a country made up of farms, the Continental Army was starving many times.  This 
was not for want of food in the countryside, but the lack of roads and an efficient Quartermaster 
Department.  Since states were given the power to raise militia and Continentals, American 
commanders had a difficult job establishing uniformity in their armies. 
It was from the experience of the American Revolution that the Continental Army came 
to resemble a professional army.  The American colonies began the war with a lack of 
centralized authority and an anti-army sentiment.  The war had shown a number of men, mostly 
in the military, the necessity of a professional and uniform military.  By the end of the war the 
Continental Army had gained a certain degree of professionalism.  It had proved a training 
ground for the young officers of the American Army.  
*** 
On July 14, 1789, French demonstrators stormed the Bastille Fortress, setting in motion a 
chain of events that would lead to the overthrow of the French monarchy and the formation of 
the French Republic.  In April 1792, the French Republic declared war on Austria.  In the next 
few years, one by one the other European monarchies would break off relations with 
Revolutionary France and eventually declare war.77  This would mark a period in Europe of more 
than 20 years of war with a few intervals of peace.  France would first fight the other European 
nations under the French Republic, and then under the leadership of Emperor Napoleon as the 
French Empire.  This era ushered in many new ideas into European warfare.  The most relevant 
to the notion of professionalism was the introduction of levee en masse, the development of a 
staff corps, and war colleges. 
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The French Army experienced many new changes in the Napoleonic era which enabled it 
to conquer most of Europe.  In order to combat the power of Austria, Great Britain, Spain, and 
Russia, the French Republic had to create enormous armies.  It did this by instituting the levee en 
masse.  France pooled its male population and made military service mandatory.  This enabled 
the French Republic to produce great numbers of soldiers for their armies in which to combat the 
other European nations.  In 1798, the French government made service compulsory for males 
between the ages of twenty to twenty five years old.  Each male had to serve for five years, or for 
the duration of the war.  At first there were no exceptions, but eventually exceptions crept into 
the policy.  In 1799, 400,000 of the one million French males were in the military’s ranks.  This 
allowed France to field armies much larger than their enemies. In addition to national 
conscription, France also introduced promotion on merit.  These two aspects allowed for large 
French armies with the promise of effective leadership.78 
France utilized the presence of a staff not only for the army commander, but for the 
division and corps commanders.  Up to this point army commanders had large staffs but division 
and brigade commanders usually had a few aides.  The presence of an effective staff made it 
much easier to process information from superiors and relay it to subordinates in a timely 
manner.  It also gave the commanders, working in a more autonomous manner than before, a 
sounding board for advice on the spot.79 
The Prussian Army went into the Napoleonic Wars still holding onto the fame of the old 
Frederician army.  A combination of Prussia’s society and the memory of Frederick the Great 
kept the Prussian Army from adapting to the times.  All of this added up to a catastrophe for the 
Prussian Army in the Napoleonic Wars.  It entered the war in 1806, and later that year its army 
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was practically destroyed by the French at the battles of Auerstadt and Jena.80  It was these two 
defeats, and the French occupation afterward, that forced the Prussian military to change.   
The defeat of the Prussian Army allowed for changes in its military.  During the period 
from 1808-1813, the Prussian military was reinvigorated.81  The officer corps was opened to all 
classes, serfdom was abolished, a ministry of war was formed, brigades were made into a 
permanent military unit, the speed on the battlefield was enhanced, and the many old generals 
were discharged from service.  The most lasting contribution to European warfare though, was 
the creation of officer schools.  In 1810, the Officer’s War College and the Junior Officers 
College were opened to further officer’s military education.  These schools focused on both 
tactics and strategy as well as non-military matters.  From this officer pool a chief of staff was 
formed for each commander in the field.  The role of the Chief of Staff was not to command 
troops.  His sole purpose was to give military advice to the commander.  “He was simply a 
highly trained officer…who could give sound advice.”82  This gave each commander a very 
highly trained military advisor.83  This greatly enhanced the effectiveness of the Prussian 
military.  
*** 
Across the Atlantic, after the Treaty of Paris in 1783, the United States of America 
achieved its independence from Great Britain.  Following the treaty there was an ongoing debate 
over the necessity of a standing army.  There was also a debate over a national versus a state run 
militia.  In his “Sentiments on a Peace Establishment”, George Washington outlined his ideas for 
America’s military in four main points.  He wanted a small regular army, totaling about 2,600 
                                                          
80
 Citino, 119. 
81
 Ibid., 129. 
82
 Ibid., 131. 
83
 Ibid., 131. 
50 
 
officers and men, to defend the frontiers and act as the core of the military.  Washington also 
stressed the need for military arsenals and fortifications, and for a military institution.  In 
addition to these points he wanted all males between the ages of 18 and 50 to be enrolled in a 
Continental Militia.  This militia would be mustered by counties and regularly trained.  Former 
Continental Army officers would be given preference for militia officer commissions.  All militia 
throughout the thirteen states would have uniformity in drill and training, using an agreed upon 
military manual.  Occasionally several militia companies would be gathered together and trained 
in battalions and regiments.  A national militia uniformly trained and drilled would negate the 
need for a large standing army.  Once war had commenced, a newly raised American Army 
would have soldiers and officers already familiar with military drill and training.84  Instead on 
June 2, 1784 Congress disbanded all but eighty men from the Continental Army.  On June 3, 
1784 Congress raised 700 militiamen from four states, for one year to form the First American 
Regiment.  The following year Congress continued the regiment, called for three year recruits, 
and omitted any reference to militia.85  The history of the American Army from this point to the 
beginning of the War of 1812 would be marked by several periods of expansion and reduction, 
corresponding with international events.  This was exactly what George Washington had warned 
about in his “Sentiments on a Peace Establishment”.86  Following Shay’s Rebellion in 1786 
Congress increased the army to over 2,000 men.  Yet the next year, the army was reduced.  The 
army was expanded in 1786, 1791-1794, 1798, 1808, and 1812-1814.  It was reduced in 1787, 
1796, 1800, 1802, and 1815.87  There was no constancy or uniformity in the American military.  
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This process severely hampered the effectiveness of the American military in the early national 
period. 
The American Constitution attempted to clarify the issue of a nationalized militia and a 
standing army.  It was also with the Constitution that the dual army tradition, begun during the 
Revolution, was institutionalized.  In the Constitution, Congress was given the power to raise 
and support armies, the ability to call forth the militia, and to regulate and govern the militia in 
national service.  When called into service, the President was the head of the national militia as 
well as the army.  He could also appoint military officers, with the advice and consent of the 
Senate.  The states though were able to retain their militia, appoint its officers, and train the 
militia according to Congress.  The issue in conflict was over a national militia or state run 
militia.  A national militia would allow for uniformity in training, weapons, and officer selection.  
It might also prevent the need for a small standing army.  Yet states guarded their right to run 
militia.  The Constitution allowed for both of these ideas.88  The emphasis was still on checks 
and balances and not on military effectiveness.   
The question over militia was answered in 1792 with the Calling Forth Act and the 
Uniform Militia Act.  Under the Calling Forth Act Congress was able to call forth militia under 
the President’s authority, but for no more than three months.  Also, the President could use the 
militia to suppress insurrection, only with the assent of a federal judge.  Under the Uniform 
Militia Act all able bodied males between eighteen and forty five were enrolled into the militia.  
Each man had to arm and equip himself.  Congress had no control over officer selection or 
training.  There was also no penalty for states or individuals who disobeyed Congress’ authority 
on these matters.89  These bills killed the idea of a national militia, and necessitated a standing 
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army.  Since individuals provided their own firearms, enforcement was left to the states, and 
there was no federal standard of training; the national militia would not be an effective solution 
to a standing army.90 
As mentioned before the history of the American Army in the early national period was a 
story of several expansions and reductions.  There were, however, four major attempts at 
professionalizing the American Army.  The first major attempt at professionalization happened 
as a result of the Northwest Indian Wars.  In 1790, the United States Army led by Brigadier 
General Josiah Harmar set out from Cincinnati to perform a show of force to the Indians in 
present day Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois.  Tensions had been very high because the army had been 
ineffective in stopping civilian encroachment onto Indian land.  This led to raids by the Indians 
and counter raids by the whites.  General Harmar divided his force of regulars and 1,500 militia 
in Indian territory.  The Indians fell upon Harmar’s detachments and defeated them in detail.  
This, along with British encouragement, emboldened the Indians to fight back against the 
Americans.91  Congress added one more regiment to the army; authorized the President to call 
out the militia, and to enlist 2,000 levies for a six month period.  Major General Arthur St. Clair 
with a force over 1,500 regulars, levies, and militia marched out from Cincinnati in September 
1791.  Poorly disciplined and led, the army was attacked on November 4 and soundly defeated.  
This was the worst defeat inflicted on the army by Indians in American history; 632 men became 
casualties.92 
St. Clair’s defeat led Congress to authorize three more regiments which were reorganized 
and named the Legion of the United States.  This force of over 5,000 men was under the 
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authority of Major General Anthony Wayne.  For two years after St. Claire’s defeat, Congress 
tried to negotiate a treaty with the Northwest Indians, while Wayne trained the new Legion.  
According to Skelton this was the first significant attempt in the professionalization of the 
American Army since the Revolution.93  Wayne had amassed 5,000 men, drilling them in the 
manner that the Continental Army had done under Steuben.  This was significant because the 
disbursement of the army had prohibited large uniformity in training and drilling.  Wayne 
blended the separate arms of the army (cavalry, artillery, and infantry) to work as a cohesive 
unit.  Wayne strictly enforced the chain of command as well as discipline within the Legion, 
which had become lax since the American Revolution.94  All of this culminated in Wayne’s 
campaign against the Northwest Indians in 1794 and the Battle of Fallen Timbers.  Wayne’s 
actions broke the power of the Northwest Indians and led to the British evacuating the forts south 
of the Great Lakes.95  The uniformity and cohesion that Wayne brought to the army was only 
temporary.  In 1796, Anthony Wayne died and Congress abolished the Legion and reduced the 
army to four infantry regiments and two companies of light dragoons.96  Many officers and 
soldiers, trained under Wayne, were dismissed and the army was scattered once again along the 
frontier. 
A second attempt at professionalization occurred in 1794 when Congress voted to create 
four arsenals, to build fortifications, and to form a Corps of Artillerists and Engineers.97  This 
was at a time when America’s tensions were running high with both Great Britain and France.  
Instead of building a large army, Congress decided to construct six frigates and concentrate on 
coastal fortifications.  The science of artillery and engineering had been pursued diligently in 
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Europe since the seventeenth century.98  These disciplines were seen to require more 
fundamental education, including mathematics.  America had relied upon European professionals 
very heavily during the eighteenth century.  In 1782, there was only one American engineer 
officer out of the fourteen in the service of the American Army.99  The army scheduled courses 
to be taught to this new corps of artillerists and engineers at West Point.  Yet, internal dissension 
and a lackluster leadership led to the cessation of classes, and scattered these officers to various 
fortifications along the coast.100 
At the height of the Quasi-War with France in 1798, Congress passed the Alien and 
Sedition Acts and greatly increased the army.101  Congress potentially authorized the President to 
command five separate American armies in the event of war with France.102  Congress 
immediately raised the so-called New Army, which consisted of twelve infantry regiments and 
six troops of dragoons.  President John Adams nominated George Washington as the 
commander, who would only accept leadership once war had been declared.  Until that time his 
inspector general, Alexander Hamilton, trained and organized the army.  William Skelton 
maintains that no other person attempted to re-organize the American Army in the early national 
period more than Alexander Hamilton.103  The impracticality of a French invasion led to 
questioning Hamilton’s motive for the army.  It may be suggested that he wanted to use the army 
as a weapon to cower his Republican opponents.104  Yet all of his work was for naught.  
President Adams, who never trusted Hamilton’s ambition, signed a treaty with France in 1800.  
In the same year, Congress disbanded the New Army, and the officers and men returned to their 
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homes.105  Russell Weigley claims, “the Federalist efforts to forge the Army into a political 
weapon assured the continuance in America of the post-Restoration English tradition of the 
nonpolitical army.106 
The last major attempt at professionalization of the army in prior to the War of 1812 was 
the formal authorization of a military academy at West Point in 1802.107  The Military Peace 
Establishment Act of 1802 institutionalized the military academy as well as reducing the army.  
This formally created a military academy from the idea of the Corps of Artillerists and Engineers 
in 1794.  President Thomas Jefferson had opposed this idea when the Federalists under 
Washington and Hamilton had proposed it.  He saw it as a haven for Federalist control of the 
military.  Yet, he was not opposed to the idea of a military academy in principle.108  He wanted a 
small army with a professional officer corps.  But these officers had to be useful to civilian 
society, and therefore West Point was mainly focused on engineering.  It was modeled after the 
Ecole Polytechnique engineering school in France.109  The academy translated European military 
texts and focused on military science, especially artillery and engineering.  Jefferson appointed 
Jonathan Williams as Superintendent of West Point.  It was under his tutelage that the study of 
engineering and artillery took shape. Yet for all of this work, West Point produced just 89 cadets 
prior to the War of 1812.110  On April 29, 1812 Congress doubled the faulty at West Point and 
allowed up to 250 cadets to be appointed yearly.111  The War of 1812 highlighted the army’s 
need for military educated officers. 
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Despite these attempts, William Skelton still maintains that the American Army was an 
amateur army.112  There are several reasons for this.  First, the small size of the army stationed 
over such a large area, prohibited training of anything larger than a company.  “In 1793, Wayne 
scattered 346 officers and men in ten satellite posts, with the entire garrisons at two consisting of 
only 14 men; four others had just 1 officer and 21 men each.  Eleven years later 2,732 officers 
and men were distributed in forty-three locations.  More than two-thirds of the troops were on or 
near the frontier, with the largest concentration, 375, at New Orleans.”113  Training and discipline 
depended on the commander at the post.  Baron von Steuben’s Blue Book from the American 
Revolution was still the de facto training manual for the army.114  Yet, Congress had not 
regulated the Blue Book as such, so it was still up to the commander on how and how often to 
train his troops.   
Another reason was the high attrition rate in the officer corps. Concerning the 
information available about the 181 officers in the American Army in 1797; forty three died in 
service, sixty nine resigned, and seven were dismissed.115  The frequency of reductions in the 
army also meant that many officers’ jobs were temporary.  In the 1816 army, only nineteen 
officers had begun their career in the eighteenth century, and a majority had not seen service 
before the War of 1812.116 
Promotion in the officer corps was based on the rule of seniority.  This allowed officers 
to gain experience in their field with the opportunity to be promoted.  Yet for higher ranks, such 
as colonel and general, many political leaders were chosen.  This was especially true during 
times of war when the army was greatly increased.  In the Legion of the United States in 1794 
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and the New Army in 1796 there were many senior and junior officers appointed from civilian 
life.  This naturally angered officers who thought they deserved a promotion.  Yet veteran 
officers had to know that these new units would be the first to be dismissed during the frequent 
army reductions.117  This practice continued in the War of 1812.  In 1813, Congress authorized 
the creation of a second major and a third lieutenant in each regiment.  Yet these positions were 
given to civilians.118  Even after the war, when the seniority rule was followed more closely, 
political patronage counted for something. 
The low pay of the soldiers and officers hampered the professionalization of the army.  A 
soldier was offered a bounty when he enlisted, which ranged from $2 in 1784 to $16 in 1798, and 
then back down to $12 in 1802.  Privates’ monthly pay fluctuated from $3 to $7 during this same 
time period.  In contrast, “between 1800 and 1811, able-bodied seamen in the coasting trade 
could expect $15.00 to $20.00 a month, and if they enlisted in the navy $10.00 to $12.00.”119  
Officers, while not as aristocratically disseminating as their European counterparts, still thought 
of themselves as gentlemen.120  Many of them did come from more well to do families, and the 
lifestyle that they thought was required of them in order to fulfill social responsibilities was not 
met by army pay.  A captain’s annual pay ranged from $420 in the 1780’s to $480 in 1812.  “In 
contrast, a government clerk, or indeed a clerk in a business, could expect $700 or $800 by 1800, 
and a few might make as much as $1,400.”121  Therefore many officers supplemented their 
military careers by also carrying on civilian jobs as well.  One officer took a leave of absence, 
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obtained a license to practice law and became a parish judge.122  The image of an officer corps as 
an elite apart from civilian life is false.123 
The lack of military institutions prohibited professional socialization of the military.  
There had been military schools for Artillery and Engineers in Europe since the late seventeenth 
century.124  Due to the combination of a growing importance of fortifications in Europe and the 
high level of mathematics needed in engineering, military academies of this period focused on 
these subjects.  In some European armies there were cadet companies where beginning officers 
served as cadets in the army.  This is true of the Prussian military in the Berlin Cadet Corps 
which produced 2,987 cadets in the span of Frederick the Great’s reign.125  In the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth century, military schools had also opened up to instruct other elements of 
the military as well.  However, most infantry and cavalry officers gained instruction in the art of 
war through independent reading and/or experience.126  West Point was not officially a military 
institution until 1802, and even then it did not garner major attention until after the War of 1812. 
From the Treaty of Paris in 1783 to the outbreak of the War of 1812 the American Army 
still maintained a level of amateurism.  The isolated military posts, relatively small size of the 
army, lack of pay, and continuous expansions and reductions limited the amount of 
professionalization.  The Legion of the United States, New Army, Corps of Artillerists and 
Engineers, and the formation of West Point were all attempts in remedying this amateurism.  Yet 
their impact was temporary and relied too much on the personality of people such as Anthony 
Wayne, Alexander Hamilton, and Jonathan Williams.127  The problem was the prestige of the 
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militia, the suspicion of a standing army, and a centralized military institution.128  At the 
outbreak of war in 1812, the United States Army was not as combat ready as it could have been, 
if these measures had been sustained. 
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Chapter 3: Failing the Test: The Early Years of the War of 1812 
 
 On June 18, 1812, Congress signed a declaration of war against Great Britain.  Ever 
since the 1790s the tension between the two countries had been growing.  The British Navy’s 
practice of impressing American sailors into service, continually aggravated the American 
public.  In 1807 the British frigate Leopard fired on the USS Chesapeake in search of British 
deserters.  This action infuriated the American public, leading to the 1808 army expansion, and 
the Embargo Act.1  During the Northwest Indian Wars of the early 1790s, American’s had 
suspected the British of supporting the Indians.  This resurfaced after the Battle of Tippecanoe in 
1811.  The Indiana Territory Governor William Henry Harrison defeated a Shawnee led Indian 
force.  After the battle Harrison found British-supplied equipment nearby.2  The War of 1812 
was the first European war for America since the American Revolution.  This war had the effect 
of reinforcing the military lessons of the American Revolution to the first American born 
generation, at a time when the Revolutionary generation was dying out.  The first two years of 
the War of 1812 would underline the United States Army’s state of unpreparedness.  In the War 
of 1812, the American military continued the practice of the dual army tradition of militia and 
regulars.  Yet this was the last war where the militia, as an institution, would play a major role.   
 The War of 1812 was the turning point for the fledgling American Army.  The army 
consisted of militia, volunteers, and regulars.  Out of a population of around 7,700,000 in 1812, 
there were estimated 703,000 militiamen available for duty in the seventeen states, as well as 
20,000 available in five territories.  It is estimated that during the war 458,000 militiamen were 
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called up.3  The militiamen were called out for ninety days by their state.  Since their time was so 
short there was little time to train, so most militiamen were not experienced and lacked 
discipline.  The second type of American military unit was the volunteer.  It was this type of 
soldier that would come to dominate the American Army during the wars in the nineteenth 
century.  The volunteer signed up for six months to one year instead of the militia’s three 
months.  This gave the commanders more of a chance to drill the volunteers.  During the War of 
1812, Congress began to place greater emphasis on the Regular Army.  This was due to the lack 
of unity, experience, drill, and leadership that continued to occur in the militia. 
There were three main issues that plagued the army in the first two years.  First, there was 
a lack of uniformity in drill.  Military standards were not uniform, there was no set of regulations 
to inform new officer recruits, and many of these new recruits were political appointees.    
Second, the Madison Administration appointed Revolutionary officers to command the 
campaigns.  These officers were in their late 50s to early 60s, and had lost much of the 
aggressiveness of their Revolutionary years.  Furthermore, many of these officers had not 
remained in the army since the American Revolution, which meant that whatever experience 
they had was decades in the past.  In addition to these Revolutionary general officers, the 
Madison administration nominated political appointees with little military experience to 
command armies.  Lastly, there was a lack of command structure within the army.  Units and 
officers within the United States Army refused to assist each other.  On top of this, the navy and 
the army were too slavish to their own plans, to assist each other in defeating the British. 
 On April 12, 1808, Congress increased the United States Army from two infantry 
regiments and a corps of engineers to seven infantry, one rifleman, one artillery, and one light 
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dragoon regiments.  Despite discrepancy between paper and actual strength, these measures 
doubled the Army’s strength from 2,700 to 5,700 officers and men.4  Henry Dearborn, the 
Secretary of War, was responsible for officer appointments.  He distributed the regiments 
throughout the states and let them recruit locally.  Officers tended to be local, regional, or state 
elites who could gather new recruits.  Dearborn allowed congress to choose officer 
appointments, which resulted in a very high number of Republican candidates chosen in 1808 
and 1809.5  Winfield Scott recorded his thought on the officers of 1808: 
It may…be safely said that many of the appointments were positively bad, and a majority 
of the remainder indifferent.  Party spirit of that day knew no bounds, and, of course, was 
blind to policy.  Federalists were almost entirely excluded from selection, though great 
numbers were eager for the field, and in the New England and some other States, there 
were but very few educated Republicans.  Hence the selections from those communities 
consisted mostly of coarse and ignorant men.  In the other States, where there was no lack 
of educated men in the dominant party, the appointments consisted, generally, of 
swaggerers, dependents, decayed gentlemen, and others-“fit for nothing else,” which 
always turned out utterly unfit for any military purpose whatever.6  
 
Despite Scott’s pessimistic view, many officers who went on to have long successful careers in 
the army received commissions in the 1808 expansion.  
 In January and June of 1812 Congress further increased the overall strength of the army 
to twenty one infantry regiments.  Congress added another nineteen regiments in 1813.  By 
March 1814, the United States Army consisted of forty-six regiments of infantry, four of 
riflemen, three of artillery, three of light dragoons, and one regiment of light artillery.  This 
amounted to 62,674 officers and men on paper.  In actuality, the largest the army became during 
the war was 38,186 officers and men.7 
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In 1813 and 1814, the Madison administration attempted to regain control of officer 
appointments, especially the general appointments.8  This resulted in the promotion of more 
deserving officers in the last year of the war.  However at the beginning of the war there was still 
a predominance of old political officers in the army high command.  In 1812, the average age of 
the fourteen generals was forty-five years old, with only one under forty.  Eleven of them had 
served in the American Revolution and only two of them had served between the Revolution and 
1808.  There were a great number of Republican appointments.9  This, combined with the army’s 
unprepared state in 1812, led to several reverses in the first and second year of the war. 
The first year of the war consisted of three disastrous campaigns.  The old generals from 
the American Revolution showed their ineffectiveness, the lack of drill and uniformity 
demonstrated itself, and the lack of cooperation between the militia and regulars appeared.  
President Madison, the Secretary of War William Eustis, and the most senior general in the 
army, Major General Henry Dearborn, devised a three part plan to invade Canada.  There would 
be three separate prongs that would converge on Canada all at the same time in order to confuse 
the British and prevent them from reinforcing any one point.  Brigadier General William Hull, a 
fifty-eight year old Revolutionary officer, would strike east from Detroit.  Brigadier General 
Stephen Van Rensselaer, a political appointee with no previous military experience, would take a 
combined regular and militia force from Buffalo, New York, and strike west towards York 
(Toronto), the capital of Upper Canada.  Major General Henry Dearborn would take a force 
north up Lake Champlain to threaten Montreal.10 
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The British forces were spread out along the St. Lawrence River and the Great Lakes. 
Water transportation was the natural way to supply the isolated posts.  Therefore, the most 
strategic plan was to strike as far east as possible, thereby cutting off supplies to every post west.  
Due to politics,the American forces had to fight at Detroit in order to eliminate the Indian threat 
and protect the frontier.  Detroit was an important center for trade and diplomacy with the 
Indians.  Ever since the American Revolution had ended British agents had supplied the 
Northwest Indians who raided American settlements in the area.  Furthermore the Shawnee 
chief, Tecumseh, had begun to build an Indian Confederation in the early years of the nineteenth 
century.  In 1811 General William Henry Harrison, the Governor of the Indiana Territory, had 
destroyed Tecumseh’s capitol at Prophetstown.  He then defeated the Shawnee at the Battle of 
Tippecanoe.  Tecumseh was certain to gain strength with the British, now that formal war had 
been declared between Great Britain and the United States.  The American government had to 
appear to care about protecting the American frontier settlements.11 
General William Hull, the governor of the Michigan Territory, was given an appointment 
as a brigadier general and ordered to raise an army and cross the Detroit River.  Hull’s Army of 
the Northwest, around twenty-two hundred men, was made up of Ohio militiamen with a 
compliment of regulars.  Hull marched his army from Ohio to the Detroit River, and crossed the 
river into Canada in mid-July.  After a brief foray Hull lost his nerve and retreated back to Fort 
Detroit.  General Brock, the British commander in Upper Canada, travelled from York to 
Amherstburg in a week with reinforcements to relieve the garrison.  The British army, now under 
Brock, crossed the Detroit River.  Joined by Tecumseh and his Indian warriors, Brock prepared 
to bombard Fort Detroit and the Americans inside.  The outnumbered Brock used his Indian 
contingent to intimidate General Hull.  Before a single shot was fired General Hull surrendered 
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the fort, the troops inside, and all of his soldiers outside the fort who had been on various 
missions.  Hull claimed that Brock’s threat of an Indian massacre forced him to think of the 
innocent civilians inside the fort and to surrender for their sake.  Brock’s bluff worked and he 
inventoried the equipment, paroled the militia, and took the regulars back to Quebec as prisoners 
of war.  With this battle, the left wing of the three prong attack had been clipped.  For the rest of 
the year the Indians and British would raid American settlements and outlying forts.12  
There were essentially two separate armies in the State of New York in 1812.  They were 
both under the supreme command of Major General Henry Dearborn, who was made the 
Commander in Chief of the United States Army.  On the Niagara Peninsula General Stephen Van 
Rensselaer, a Federalist politician, commanded the militia army.  Van Rensselaer was a militia 
general, which caused major problems in the campaign.  The regulars in the area were under the 
command of Brigadier General Alexander Smyth who had stationed himself at Buffalo.  
Refusing to submit to a militia general, he decided not to assist Van Rensselaer’s proposed attack 
across the Niagara River at the town of Lewiston.  Van Rensselaer’s army was composed mostly 
of militia with a few regular army units, including the 2nd US Artillery under Lieutenant Colonel 
Winfield Scott.  This would be Winfield Scott’s first major combat experience in his long career.  
Scott, more than any other officer, would be responsible for the professionalization of the United 
States Army in the first half of the nineteenth century.  Van Rensselaer crossed the Niagara River 
at Lewiston at 3 am on October 13, 1812.  Due to a lack of boats, the four thousand man 
American army could cross only six hundred men at a time.  Once on the Canadian side, the 
Americans found themselves pinned down by British troops on the shore and a British cannon on 
the heights.  At the sound of the gunfire General Brock, who had returned from Detroit, rode 
down to Queenston from Fort George summoning reinforcements along the way.  He arrived at 
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Queenston and took command of the cannon that was firing on the Americans.  One daring 
American officer named Captain John E. Wool led some men up the escarpment and descended 
upon the unprotected rear of British artillery position.  Brock and the men with him at the cannon 
fled for cover without a moment to spare.  He then rallied two hundred men and made a 
counterattack against the Americans, which was driven back and resulted in the death of General 
Brock at the head of his troops.  The Americans held the heights but could not send enough 
reinforcements to hold them.  The militiamen on the opposite shore, watching the battle, refused 
to leave American soil claiming the right that as militia they could not cross into another country.  
Eventually the British General Sheaffe led some regulars and Indians against what was left of the 
Americans on the heights.  After a gallant fight, and with no prospect of reinforcements, the 
Americans surrendered.  Among the surrendered were 925 soldiers and officers including a 
brigadier general and five lieutenant colonels.  Six weeks after the Battle of Queenston Heights, 
General Smyth, now in command on the Niagara Peninsula, attempted unsuccessfully to cross 
the Niagara River at Buffalo.  The soldiers then went into winter quarters. 13 
The third prong to the invasion of Canada involved the American army at Plattsburg, NY 
adjacent to Lake Champlain which was under the direct command of General Dearborn.  In 
November the general decided to call off the offensive into Canada due to disease in his army, 
and instead he sent Col. Zebulon Pike north with a force of six hundred regulars.  Pike led his 
men to a Canadian blockhouse at La Colle Mill and there fought a minor battle with the British 
on Nov. 20, 1812.  After a few hours of firing, both forces fell back.  This effectively ended the 
campaigns of 1812.  These three failed campaigns ended with the Secretary of War William 
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Eustis resigning on December 3, 1812.  On February 3rd John Armstrong Jr. was nominated as 
the new Secretary of War.14 
 Generals Hull, Van Rensselaer, Smyth, and Dearborn had all failed in both the tactical 
and strategic aspects of their respective campaigns.  Of these commanders, one was a political 
appointee and two were Revolutionary officers.  Stephen Van Rensselaer was a Federalist 
politician who was nominated as a militia general by his political rival, New York Governor 
Daniel Tompkins, in order to get him out of New York City.15  General Hull had served in many 
battles during the American Revolution, rising to the rank of lieutenant colonel.  He was made 
Governor of the Michigan Territory in 1805.  He received his commission in 1812 even though 
he had not seen campaigning since the American Revolution.16  General Dearborn had also 
served in the American Revolution.  After the Revolution he became an influential politician, 
becoming the Secretary of War under Jefferson.  He likewise received his commission in 
1812.17Only General Smyth could be said to be a professional soldier.  He was the Inspector 
General of the Army, and had written a copy of infantry tactics.  However he became discredited 
after vigorously proclaiming he was going to invade Canada after the Battle of Queenston 
Heights, and then failing to do so.18  These men were the generals of the American armies in the 
first year of the war because of the lack of capable officers.  America had not engaged in a war 
with a European power since the American Revolution.  The last time a major conflict had 
occurred was during the Northwest Indian Wars.  Unfortunately Anthony Wayne was dead, and 
the Revolutionary officers had not remained in the army.  The academy at West Point had only 
started in 1802 and the officers turned out were placed in the Engineer Corps or in the artillery.  
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Therefore there were few subordinate officers with enough experience and knowledge to make 
up for the deficiencies of the senior commanders.  
 There was tremendous confusion in the chain of command and communication in the 
United States Army.  This confusion was due to the lack of a comprehensive hierarchy in the 
American military, an example of the semi-professionalism of the army as a whole.  All three of 
the 1812 attacks were supposed to begin at the same time, in order to impair the British’s ability 
to concentrate their forces.  Hull’s campaign began in July and ended in August.  The Battle of 
Queenston Heights did not occur until mid-October, and Dearborn did not meet the British until 
November and then promptly retreated.19  This allowed General Brock to block both the 
American push from Detroit and then from Buffalo.  Furthermore, there was a no clear 
commander on the Niagara Peninsula.  General Smyth refused to serve under the command of 
the militia General Van Rensselaer.  Smyth even refused to assist Van Rensselaer in his attack at 
Queenston.  This also was reflected in the other regular officers.  Lieutenant Colonel Winfield 
Scott took his artillery regiment to Queenston the night before the battle, but refused to serve 
under the militia commander.  “He [Scott] was refused, because all arrangements were made and 
instructions given, placing Lieutenant-Colonel Van Rensselaer, the chief of the general’s staff, at 
the head of the movement, and I [Scott], his senior would not serve under any junior…”20  The 
militia also refused to follow orders and assist the soldiers already on the Canadian side of the 
Niagara River.  Major General Van Rensselaer on the American side of the river is supposed to 
have written to Scott, “I have passed through my camp.  Not a regiment, not a company is 
willing to join you.  Save yourselves by a retreat, if you can.”21  These examples illustrate the 
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lack of coordination and command structure in the United States Army at the beginning of the 
War of 1812.   
 Out of the disasters of 1812, the United States Army and the administration recognized 
the need for effective command. The administration attempted to remedy the confusion in the 
chain of command.  The first change was the replacement of the Secretary of War William 
Eustis, with John Armstrong Jr.  John Armstrong Jr. was a veteran of the Revolutionary War and 
more capable in strategic terms than his predecessor.22 
In 1813, Madison made appointments of four major generals and seven brigadier 
generals.  The major generals were James Wilkinson, Wade Hampton, William Henry Harrison, 
and Morgan Lewis.  Wilkinson and Hampton had both been American Revolutionary officers.  
Wilkinson had stayed in the army since the American Revolution gaining experience in the 
Northwest Indian Wars and in the South.  Lewis was a friend of President Madison’s and was 
therefore a political appointee.  Harrison was a major general of militia and governor of the 
Indiana Territory, but he was young, stern, and aggressive.23  General Harrison had military 
experience as the Governor of the Indiana Territory before the War of 1812.  One year before the 
outbreak of the War of 1812, Harrison marched an army of one thousand men into Indian 
Territory and defeated an Indian army at the Battle of Tippecanoe on Nov.7, 1811.  Furthermore 
he, like Anthony Wayne with whom he had served in 1794, was a stickler for drill.  Except for 
the forty year old Harrison, the average age of the major generals was fifty seven.24 
The brigadier generals that were promoted were Zebulon Pike, George Izard, Lewis Cass, 
Duncan McArthur, William Winder, Benjamin Howard, and Thomas Parker.  Of these new 
generals, Pike and Izard were young professionals with military training.  Thomas Parker had 
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fought in the American Revolution but had remained in the army as colonel since that time.  
These generals were much younger than their superiors.25  In addition to some of these generals, 
a few junior officers also began to show military promise.  These officers would go on to be 
major figures in the 1814 campaigns.   
Another sign of improvement in 1813 was the beginning of the General Staff.  Up to the 
War of 1812, most logistical duties for the military were performed by civil agents.  This led to a 
great deal of conflict between the military officers and the civil agents, and in many cases to 
extortion.  In the War of 1812 and beyond, these logistical duties would be carried out by staff 
bureaus.26  Despite these promising signs in the army, it was still plagued by the same problems 
as in 1812.   
 There was much more cooperation in 1813 than there had been in 1812.  There were 
three instances of this, of which the most decisive example took place in the west.  Ever since 
General Hull had surrendered at Detroit, the British and their Indian allies had been raiding 
settlements on the Western Frontier.  As was common in the other theaters of the war, water 
transportation was key to supplying British soldiers.  Therefore the first major conflict took place 
on Lake Erie.  Commodore Perry, a young and promising naval officer, had been put in 
command of the Lake Erie fleet.  On September 13, 1813, Perry’s fleet engaged the British at 
Put-In-Bay near the Ohio coast.  In the Battle of Lake Erie Perry crushed the British fleet once 
and for all, and in a famous note wrote to General Harrison, “We have met the enemy, and they 
are ours.”27  William Henry Harrison had been anxiously waiting with his army on the nearby 
shore, and once the note came he marched his army of well-trained soldiers towards Detroit.  
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Instead of fighting, the British army under General Procter, retreated to the Canadian side of the 
Detroit River and began to march his army further east along the Thames River.  Perry ferried 
Harrison’s army across the Detroit River and joined his army marching to overtake the British.  
On October 5, 1813 Harrison’s army caught up with the British at Moraviantown on Canadian 
soil.  In the resulting Battle of the Thames, Harrison put the British to flight, and effectively 
crushed unified Indian resistance in the West by killing Tecumseh.  This battle resulted in the 
British retreating eastward all the way to the Niagara Peninsula.  The Americans now had 
undisputed control over Lake Erie and could move troops from the Michigan Territory to the 
East.28 
 Another example occurred on Lake Ontario when the army and navy cooperated to 
assault York, the capital of Upper Canada.  General Pike was ordered to take twenty-five 
hundred men to assault York.  The army was sailed across the lake by Commodore Chauncey’s 
Lake Ontario fleet.  The army landed at York on April 29, 1813 and drove off the British troops 
commanded by General Sheaffe, Brock’s replacement, with comparatively little loss.  The 
Americans then went on to sack the Canadian capital and to burn the ship being constructed in 
the harbor.  The biggest loss for the Americans was the death of General Pike, who was killed 
when a powder magazine exploded sending down a shower of debris that crushed him.  Despite 
the loss of this officer, the raid was a success.29 
 The last example of this army/navy cooperation occurred on the Niagara Peninsula in late 
May.  A portion of the Lake Ontario squadron ferried Colonel Winfield Scott and forty-five 
hundred troops from the eastern side of the Niagara River past the British Fort George and 
landed west of the fort.  The Americans quickly pushed back the British force opposing their 
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landing and drove them from Fort George.  The American assault was so unexpected and swift, 
that the British withdrew all of their troops from the Niagara River forts.30 
 These three examples of excellent cooperation and coordination were overshadowed by 
two subsequent events.  Instead of immediately pursuing the British army after the Battle of Fort 
George, the Niagara army leisurely pushed westward.  The army was under two subordinate 
commanders, Brigadier Generals William Winder and John Chandler.  Both men were political 
appointees.   The two generals were surprised and utterly defeated at Stoney Creek on June 6 
when the British force attacked at night.  Later in June, the British defeated another American 
force on the Niagara Peninsula at Beaver Dams.  The series of defeats pushed the American 
forces back to Fort George.31 
In July, General Wilkinson commanded an army moving eastward up the St. Lawrence 
River towards Montreal.  General Hampton, a personal enemy of Wilkinson’s, commanded an 
army that was supposed to move up Lake Champlain towards Montreal.  These two forces were 
supposed to meet at the city and destroy it.  The two commanders failed to cooperate, resulting in 
the Battles of Chrysler’s Farm and Chateauguay.  These battles combined with the onset of 
winter forced the American armies to retreat back into New York and end the campaign.32 
 The first two years of the War of 1812 showcased the ill-prepared state of the United 
States Army.  The high command was flooded with political and senior Revolutionary generals.  
These men lacked the aggressiveness or military experience requisite in commanding the armies.  
Furthermore, there was a deficiency in the army command structure and cooperation within the 
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army and between the army and navy.  Camillus M. Mann, the editor of the Baltimore National 
Museum and Weekly Gazette wrote a letter to President Madison in December 1813 stating the 
problems of the American military as he saw them.  He stated that: 
The land military force of our confederated country is not commensurate with the 
emergency…The collision between the army proper, and the actual militia, is injurious to 
the Union…The insubordinate independence of the militia is galling, perplexing, and of 
bad example to troops compelled by the severities of stricter regulations.33 
 
Two bright spots in the early years of the War of 1812 were the beginnings of the 
General Staff which helped facilitate supply, and the emergence of junior officers.  A staff 
department allowed for a more comprehensible and efficient mode of supply for the army.  Up to 
this point civilians had commanded most of the supply duties.  The list of energetic young 
officers came to the fore in 1813, and they would command in 1814.  General Harrison and 
Commodore Perry had won in the West.  Zebulon Pike, Jacob Brown, Winfield Scott, Alexander 
Macomb, and Andrew Jackson were all rising stars in the East.  It was the emergence of battle 
tested junior and senior officers who would change the army’s fortunes in 1814 and assist in the 
professionalization of the United States Army in the postwar era.   
 
 
 
  
                                                          
33
 James Madison, “A letter from Camillus M. Mann to James Madison, December 19, 1813,” in The 
Papers of James Madison: Presidential Series 7 Vols., ed. J. C. A. Stagg (Charlottesville: University of 
Virginia Press, 2004), 5:121-122.  
74 
 
Chapter 4: 1814 and the Advent of Professionalism 
 
By 1814, the United States Army had two years of fighting experience against a 
professional European army.  This gave the junior officers time to gain experience in 
commanding troops, and it allowed the inefficient commanders to be weeded out.  The army did 
considerably better in the last year of the war than in the previous two.  This was due to the 
emergence of young, battle experienced, capable leaders as well as examples of more sternly 
drilled and uniform armies.  In 1814, many of the Revolutionary officers fell by the wayside 
including Wade Hampton and James Wilkinson.  Unfortunately for the Army, William Henry 
Harrison resigned his post in the belief that Congress denied him advancement.  In addition, 
Harrison had created an enemy of Secretary of War John Armstrong Jr. who saw Harrison as a 
political rival.  In order to negate Harrison’s popularity, Armstrong kept him from a meaningful 
military post.  Armstrong also led a Congressional investigation of Harrison’s accounts in his 
1813 campaign.  Harrison resigned on May 11, 1814.1In their place Madison promoted George 
Izard and Jacob Brown to major general.  He also promoted six officers to brigadier general: 
Alexander Macomb, Thomas Smith, Daniel Bissell, Edmund P. Gaines, Winfield Scott, and 
Eleazar Ripley.  While some of these officers had served in the pre-war army and some had not, 
all of them had worked their way through the ranks during the first two years of the war.  
Furthermore the average age of the brigadier generals was thirty-three.  Many of these men 
would perform well in 1814 and continue in the army after the war.2 
 There were four theaters of war in 1814; the Niagara Peninsula, the Lake Champlain 
region, the American South, and coastal Maryland.  This year was a much greater test for the 
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United States Army because Napoleon had been exiled to Elba, which left Great Britain free to 
send thousands of soldiers from Europe to North America.  Officers in three of the four major 
campaigns would go on to gain high positions in the postwar army.  An outline of these 
campaigns will help project the army and the officers instrumental in professionalizing it.  
In 1813, the Americans had pushed the British from the Detroit area, had sacked York 
and taken the forts at the mouth of the Niagara River.  Everything except the most important 
goals had been accomplished, the taking of Kingston and Montreal.  This was John Armstrong’s 
objective for the campaign of 1814.  The Americans now had two armies in New York, one at 
Lake Champlain and one at Sacketts Harbor at the eastern end of Lake Ontario.  Again instead of 
providing an overall commander, Armstrong appointed two new generals to command each 
army.  Major General Jacob Brown was made commander of the army at Sacketts Harbor and 
Major General George Izard was given command at Plattsburg.  These two men, unlike their 
predecessors, were young, competent, and had fought continuously through the ranks from the 
beginning of the war.  The plan was to have Izard threaten Montreal, as in the previous year, 
while Brown moved against Kingston.  Due to the heavy fortifications at Kingston, and a 
misunderstanding in a series of confusing letters, Brown moved his army to the Niagara region.3 
 In early December 1813, the new Lt. Governor of Upper Canada, Sir Gordon Drummond, 
arrived on the Niagara peninsula.  The Americans had abandoned Fort George when Wilkinson 
had taken the troops to Montreal.  Drummond immediately ordered an assault on Fort Niagara 
which was carried out flawlessly on December 19.  In the days that followed, Drummond’s 
subordinate, Major General Phineas Riall marched south burning Lewiston, Manchester (Niagara 
                                                          
3
 Mahon, 266-284. 
76 
 
Falls), Black Rock, and Buffalo.  The American side of the Niagara River had become a 
wasteland.4 
 The army that Jacob Brown commanded in the Niagara campaign in 1814 was called the 
Left Division.  It was so called because the Right Division was the army that was stationed in 
eastern New York at Plattsburg.  The four brigadier generals at the beginning of the campaign 
were generals Edmund Pendleton Gaines, Winfield Scott, Eleazar Ripley, and Peter B. Porter.  
Edmund Pendleton Gaines and Winfield Scott had both seen service prior to the war and had 
extensive service from the beginning of the war.  Eleazar Ripley volunteered in 1812 and had 
served admirably since then.  Peter B. Porter was a militia commander and a War Hawk 
congressman.  He commanded the militia, volunteers, and Indians in the 1814 Niagara 
campaign.5  There were also a number of important regimental officers which included but were 
not limited to Major Henry Leavenworth, Major Thomas Jesup, and Colonel James Miller.  By 
1814, all of these men had seen service and had become competent in their duties.  This allowed 
the Left Division to meet the British on a much more level playing ground than it had in 1812.
 It was apparent to Brown by March 1814, that he would invade Canada through the 
Niagara Peninsula.  He therefore sent General Scott and Ripley to Buffalo with four of his five 
regiments.  From April until July Scott set up a camp in Buffalo and drilled these soldiers 
everyday using one of the three handbooks available.  This camp has been highlighted as the 
reason for the army’s success.6  By the end of June 1814, General Brown had arrived at Buffalo.  
He divided his army into three brigades.  General Scott would command the first brigade, 
General Ripley the second brigade, and General Porter commanded the third brigade which was 
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composed of five hundred Indians, a company of mounted riflemen, and a regiment of 
Pennsylvania volunteers. 
 The Left Division crossed the Niagara River from Buffalo, on the morning of July 3, 
1814 and quickly forced the garrison at Fort Erie to surrender.  After almost two days of 
transferring the army to the Canadian side, as well as establishing the base at the fort, General 
Brown marched his army north towards Niagara Falls.  General Riall, who heard about the 
American crossing, marched south from Fort George with an army of about 2,200 men.  The two 
forces met just south of Niagara Falls on July 5 at the little town of Chippewa.  In the resultant 
battle, the Americans defeated the British on a plain in a conventional European battle.  In the 
aftermath of the battle, General Brown pushed the British army all the way back to Fort George.  
The American army stopped at Queenston and waited in vain for the Lake Erie naval fleet to 
arrive with siege cannon before assaulting Fort George.  By July 20, with no sight of the 
American Navy, Brown retreated back to Chippewa.7 
In the last week of July Sir Gordon Drummond landed on the Niagara Peninsula with 
reinforcements and immediately ordered an advance upon the Americans.  Brown in turn ordered 
Scott to advance to Niagara Falls.  On the evening of July 25 both armies met a mile from the 
falls.  In the Battle of Lundy’s Lane, or the Battle of Niagara, the Americans pushed the British 
off of their position.  Due to heavy casualties, including Generals Brown and Scott, the 
Americans under Ripley withdrew in the middle of the night back to Chippewa.  This has led to 
many disputes over which side wonthe battle.  The Americans withdrew under their own 
initiative after repulsing every attack the British made.  However in the morning the British held 
the field.  After the Battle of Lundy’s Lane, General Ripley, who took the place of the wounded 
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General Brown, pulled the Left Division back to Fort Erie.  Disgusted with Ripley’s apparent 
lack of resolution, General Brown ordered General Gaines to come from Sacketts Harbor and 
take command at Fort Erie.  General Drummond and the British army, after a week of rest, 
arrived outside the fort on August 2, 1814.  The week allowed the Americans to expand the 
fortifications of Fort Erie with batteries, redoubts, abatis, and trenches.  The British constructed 
batteries of their own to bombard the fort, and began the siege of Fort Erie.  The siege lasted 
from August 2 to September 20, 1814, and involved two major events.8 
 At 2 am on August 15, the British army assaulted the American siege works in three 
waves.  The first two attacks were repulsed with heavy casualties.  The third column succeeded 
in wresting the northeast bastion of Fort Erie from the Americans.  The attack appeared to have 
gained momentum, when at 5am a huge explosion erupted in the bastion.  This explosion had the 
effect of ending the British attack.  The British had suffered an estimated 1,000 casualties, while 
the Americans suffered fewer than ninety.9  
 In early September General Brown returned to command, to take over for the wounded 
General Gaines.  He planned a two pronged sortie to take place on September 17.  The two 
prongs were led by General Porter and General Miller.  The U.S. troops focused their attack on 
three British batteries.  They succeeded in capturing two batteries, but a combination of weather, 
an experienced enemy, and the failure of the reserve to provide sufficient support forced the 
Americans back into Fort Erie.  The American attack, at a cost of more than six hundred 
casualties, reinforced General Drummond’s decision to lift the siege.10 
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 Late in September General George Izard, and the Right Division of the American army at 
Plattsburg, arrived in the Niagara region to join forces with Brown.  As the senior officer, Izard 
took command of the combined 6,500 man army.  Izard did not have the aggressive spirit of 
Brown and instead of pressing the outmatched Drummond, Izard held back at Fort Erie.  In 
October, Izard sent a small force out to swing around the British army.  The skirmish known as 
the Battle of Cook’s Mill on October 19 ended the campaign.  In November, Izard blew up Fort 
Erie and withdrew all his soldiers back into America.  Izard’s caution in engaging the British 
frustrated the aggressive Brown.  Once Izard decided to return to the American side of the 
Niagara River, Brown asked to be transferred to Sacketts Harbor.  In the end, the Niagara 
campaign of 1814 gave no significant strategic advantage to the Americans.  Yet, the campaign 
was important to the nation.  American regulars had defeated the British army several times in 
open combat.  The officers from this division in particular would hold many key positions in the 
postwar army.11  In his message to Congress, James Madison stated: 
The splendid victories gained on the Canadian side of the Niagara, by the American 
forces under major general Brown, and brigadiers Scott and Gaines, have gained for 
those heroes, and their emulating companions, the most unfading laurels; and, having 
triumphantly tested progressive discipline of the American soldiers…12  
 
 While battle raged on the Niagara, Governor General of Canada Sir George Prevost 
launched a major invasion down Lake Champlain in September.  General Izard had taken most 
of the American forces west towards the Niagara Peninsula.  A combined army/navy victory 
halted the invasion at Plattsburgh on September 11, 1814.  The American fleet on Lake 
Champlain, under Thomas MacDonough, defeated the British in a furious naval battle.  General 
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Alexander Macomb with 5,000 soldiers halted Prevost’s army at Plattsburgh.  This dual defeat 
forced Prevost to withdraw back up into Canada.  The naval defeat was particularly destructive, 
because the British relied on water transportation for their supplies.  Without the navy to bring 
supplies, Prevost decided to withdraw back into Canada. 13 
 In contrast to these two campaigns was the British invasion of Washington.  An example 
of the lingering poor logistical and command structure in the army was the fact that the British 
were able to so easily capture the nation’s capital.  A British army under General Robert Ross 
defeated an American militia force at the Battle of Bladensburg, after which the British marched 
into Washington D.C. and burned it.  Following this triumph the British moved north to attack 
Baltimore.  General Ross was killed in a skirmish leading up to Baltimore.  The British stopped 
outside Baltimore’s fortifications and waited for the British fleet to take Fort McHenry.  On 
September 13, the British fleet bombarded the fort.  The next day revealed the American flag 
was still flying.  The British withdrew on the fourteenth, thereby halting the Chesapeake 
campaign.  In this campaign the American militia had been routed as in the American 
Revolution.  They had not been under a competent leader and, more importantly, there had been 
no trained force to defend the United States capital.  The militiamen were hastily formed and the 
city had never been fortified.  This led to the dismissal of Secretary of War John Armstrong.  
This was a reminder of the continuing amateurism of the American Army.  More specifically this 
shows the lack of a military hierarchy.  Had there been one in place, the nation’s capital would 
never have been left undefended.14 
 In the Southern Theater, Major General Andrew Jackson had defeated the Creek Indians 
in a campaign that lasted from 1813 to early 1814.  A large portion of the Creek nation had 
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goneon the warpath in 1813 and had killed over 500 whites at Fort Mims.  General Andrew 
Jackson hounded the Creek Indians.  At the Battle of Horseshoe Bend he crushed the remaining 
strength of the Creek.  In May, Jackson marched to New Orleans and set about preparing the 
city’s defenses for a planned British attack.  The last battle of the War of 1812 would be fought 
once a treaty had been written but before it had been ratified.  A British force under General 
Packenham, the brother-in-law of the Duke of Wellington, conducted a campaign against New 
Orleans.  Jackson assembled a force of marines, sailors, regulars, militia and volunteers, free 
black men, Choctaw Indians, and pirates to defend the city.  On December 23, 1814, Jackson 
attacked the British who were only nine miles from the city.  After the battle, Jackson retreated 
to a defensive position that he had prepared.  After a couple of small probes,Packenham 
assaulted Jackson’s fortifications on January 8, 1815 in the Fourth Battle of New Orleans.  The 
resultant battle destroyed the British army, inflicting almost 2,000 casualties to Jackson’s fifty.  
This battle made Jackson a hero and would be held up as the reason for the peace.  The Treaty of 
Ghent had actually been signed on December 24, 1814.  Despite this discrepancy in dates, the 
Battle of New Orleans became celebrated as a militia victory in the mold of the Battles of 
Bunker Hill or Bennington.15 
 At the end of the war Congress cut the general officers to two major generals and four 
brigadier generals.  Andrew Jackson and Jacob Brown were militia generals who had risen 
through the ranks to become regular major generals.  They were transitional figures, wartime 
appointees who performed well in the war.  The brigadier generals were Eleazar Ripley, 
Alexander Macomb, Edmund P. Gaines, and Winfield Scott.  Ripley, Gaines, and Scott had all 
had prominent positions in the 1814 Niagara campaign.  Macomb had commanded the American 
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army that turned the British back at the Battle of Plattsburgh.  Besides these men, there were a 
number of field officers who contributed to the victories of the Army in 1814.16  The emergence 
of these young, battle experienced officers was cemented shortly after the war when a board of 
generals was convened.  This board had the task of screening the officer corps and selecting 
those to be retained in the post-war army.17  The officer corps was reduced from 3,495 to 674 
officers.  Despite the principle of seniority, President Madison and the board selected young 
battle tested generals and officers.  All of the officers tied with the American Revolution, and the 
political appointees were dismissed.18  The board retained sixty-two of the high ranking wartime 
commanders.  The average age of these commanders was thirty-three, with seven years average 
experience.  These young commanders remembered the failures of the early part of the War of 
1812, and set about stabilizing and reforming the army.19 
 A recurring example of the confused nature of the army early in the war was the lack of a 
unifying training regimen.  There were three manuals that were mostly used by officers to train 
their soldiers.  These were Baron Von Steuben’s Blue Book from the American Revolution, 
William Duane’s Handbook for Infantry (1813) and Alexander Smyth’s Regulations for the 
Field Exercises…of the Infantry (1813).  The last two were both based on French manuals.20  The 
absence of a uniform tactics manual was compounded by the lack of a thorough training camp.  
The most highly recorded example of a training camp occurred under General Winfield Scott at 
Flint Hill in Buffalo, New York.  This occurred in April 1814, leading up to the campaign 
conducted by the Left Division later that summer.  General Scott drilled four of the six regular 
regiments that would constitute the division.  In ten weeks, Scott had drilled the core for the 
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division in uniform training.21  It attests to the ongoing disarray in the army that one, this camp 
was needed two years into the war, and two that it is the most widely known example of a drill 
camp.  Part of this is because of the results of the later campaign, and part because Winfield 
Scott recorded these events in his autobiography in 1866.  The men from this division went on to 
validate their training in the Battles of Chippewa, Lundy’s Lane, and Fort Erie.  Yet even this 
example has a fault.  The other American army in New York State, the Right Division, was 
under Major General Izard in Plattsburgh, New York.  Izard trained his army using Steuben’s 
Blue Book, while Scott had used the French system.  When these two armies later merged in late 
September 1814, they were under two separate sets of drills.22  Officers could not easily be 
transferred between the two forces, because the soldiers would be trained in a different style.  
Also, these two forces would have a much more difficult time operating in tandem on the 
battlefield.   
 The War of 1812 renewedinterest in the Military Academy at West Point.  From the 
official founding in 1802 to 1812, 89 cadets graduated from West Point.23  On April 29, 1812, 
Congress authorized West Point to appoint up to 250 cadets into the Academy.24  Up to the end 
of the war, West Point cadets entered into the engineering or artillery corps.  These positions 
limited their effectiveness, because these two branches of service had the least amount of 
promotion.  Despite the scattering of these cadets, they did show their influence.  Joseph Swift 
was the first graduate of West Point.  In 1813, he was General Wilkinson’s Chief Engineer 
during the campaign against Montreal.  Sylvanus Thayer graduated from West Point in 1808 and 
entered into the Engineer Corps.  During the War of 1812 he constructed fortifications.  He also 
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joined General Wilkinson’s Montreal campaign.25  There were two West Point cadets in the Left 
Division during the Niagara campaign of 1814.  Lieutenant Colonel William McRee (an 1805 
West Point graduate) was the divisional engineer and Major Eleazar D. Wood (1808 graduate) 
was his assistant.26  These two staff officers had an important, if unheralded, effect on the 
effectiveness of the Left Division.  In many instances throughout the campaign, these two 
officers had the duty of selecting sites for the infantry and artillery positions of the army.27  At 
the Battle of Fort Erie, these two officers commanded important batteries against the British 
assault.  Lieutenant Colonel McRee commanded the artillery in Douglass Battery, and Major 
Wood commanded four infantry companies at Snake Hill.28  In the subsequent sortie, Major 
Wood commanded 400 soldiers in one of the attacking columns.29  The conduct of the West 
Point officers, and the war in general, induced Congress to re-focus attention on West Point.   
The experience during the War of 1812 precipitated the solidification of the 
professionalization of the United States Army in the early national period of the United States of 
America.  From the end of the war in 1815 to the beginning of the Mexican War, the United 
States Army would go through changes that resulted in a professional army.  The experience 
from the War of 1812, and the officers who fought in it, led to the professionalization of the 
army during the 1820s and 1830s. 
 The news of the victory at the Battle of New Orleans and the signing of the Treaty of 
Ghent arrived in Washington in late January and early February 1815.  This decisive victory, on 
top of the army’s increasingly better results along the northern border and the victory at Fort 
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McHenry, superseded the burning of Washington in the mind of the populace.  This led to a great 
surge in nationalism and better opinion of the regular army in the post war years. This 
nationalism and good feeling towards the American Army was mirrored by Congress.  In March 
1815, Congress debated the topic of army reduction.  Writing to the Military Committee of the 
Senate in February 1815, Secretary of War James Monroe wrote: 
From the view which I have taken of the subject I am of the opinion that not less than 
20,000 troops ought for the present to be retained in service, to be composed of every 
species of force, that is of infantry, cavalry and artillery…By retaining a part of every 
species of force now in service the knowledge which has been acquired in the science of 
war may be preserved and improved.30 
 
 Despite Monroe’s opinion, Congress authorized the reduction of the American Army to 12,000 
men.  Yet, this number was still the largest the army had been in peacetime in the young nation’s 
history.31 
The professionalization of the American Army continued to be pushed forward by 
Monroe’s successors, Secretaries of War William H. Crawford (1815-1816) and John C. 
Calhoun (1817-1825).  William Skelton identifies John C. Calhoun as the conduit for the 
professional army officers.32  Calhoun was essential to the army in several ways.  By 1821, the 
goodwill towards the army had started to decline.  This was due in part to the poor economy 
resulting from the Panic of 1819, the price spent on the army, and the poor reception following 
General Andrew Jackson’s invasion of Spanish Florida.33  Congress intended on reducing the 
army, and instructed Calhoun to prepare a reduction plan.  Calhoun wrote an impassioned speech 
for the defense of the United States Army.  After conversing with his officers, Calhoun 
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recommended a cadre system, also known as the “skeleton” or “expansible” army plan.34  In this 
plan, the line soldiers would be reduced while maintaining the actual companies and officers. 
In previous reductions, Congress had eliminated whole companies and regiments.  The 
“skeleton” plan reduced the number of soldiers in each company, while retaining the officers.  
Thus, when war threatened, the incoming soldiers could be used to bring each company up to full 
strength.  The new soldiers would be placed under experienced officers, and with experienced 
soldiers, thereby allowing for a trained army in a much shorter time than it had taken previously.  
This concept had been put forward by previous American leaders, as recently as James Monroe 
in 1815.35  In March 1821, Congress slashed the American Army to 6,183 officers and men.  Yet 
it did retain the skeleton concept proposed by Calhoun.  The act cut the authorized enlistment 
strength of the army by half, but it reduced the officer corps by only one-fifth.  While Congress 
did not officially endorse Calhoun’s idea, it did allow for a greater ration of officers to men.36 
Despite an interest in retaining the experience gained from the War of 1812, the general 
feeling toward the United States Army did decline as years passed from the end of the war.  In 
1822, James Monroe wrote, “I was exposed, in the course of the last Session, to much 
embarrassment.  The lessons of the late war seem to have been forgotten, and the efforts since 
made to put the country in a better state of defense for another…have been tortured into crimes, 
and those who have been most active treated as the greatest criminals.”37  The usual threat of a 
standing army, and the expense, was directed against the United States Army.   
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The professionalization of the army during the post-war years can be shown in five 
examples; the development of a General Staff and Commanding General, the production and 
circulation of uniform training manuals, the emergence of the Military Academy at West Point, 
the Board of Engineers, and the higher proportion of career officers. 
 In 1816, and then again in 1818, Congress expanded and improved the General Staff, 
which had been formed in 1813.  John C. Calhoun on December 14, 1818 communicated his 
thoughts on the General Staff to the House of Representatives: 
In fact, no part of our military organization requires more attention in peace than our 
general staff.  It is in every service invariably the last in attaining perfection; and, if 
neglected in peace, when there is leisure, it will be impossible, in the midst of the hurry 
and bustle of war, to bring it to perfection.  It is in peace that it should receive a perfect 
organization, and that the officers should be trained to method and punctuality; so that, at 
the commencement of war, instead of creating anew, nothing more should be necessary 
than to give to it the necessary enlargement.38 
 
The focus on the General Staff had the effect of increasing the efficiency of the army by 
eliminating civilian agents and bringing a sense of order to the army’s logistics.  This General 
Staff included an Inspector General, an Adjutant General, a Quartermaster General, a Paymaster 
General, a Commissary General, a Surgeon General, and Chief of Engineers.39  Under an 1818 
act, Secretary of War Calhoun had these bureau heads attached to the War Department, with 
their headquarters in Washington D.C. to allow for accessibility with the administration.40  Up 
until 1817, the headquarters of the heads of departments had been spread throughout the nation.  
This, in an age void of fax machines, telephones, and computers meant that cooperation and 
communication amongst the various department heads and the Secretary of War was very 
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tedious.  The field staff officers from each department were to send their reports directly to the 
respective department heads in Washington D.C.  By 1820, the General Staff had reached a state 
that it would retain until the twentieth century.41  Each commander on the General Staff was in 
charge of a specific logistical issue connected with the military.  Furthermore, the General Staff 
held their positions for many years in the post-war army.  This gave the Secretary of War a 
knowledgeable administrative staff.   
 In connection with the General Staff was the position of Commanding General which 
was created in 1821, as a byproduct of the reduction of the army.42  Congress cutback the general 
officers to one major general and two brigadier generals.  The major general position effectively 
became the Commanding General.  This decision was made easier when Major General Andrew 
Jackson resigned his commission in 1821 after the conclusion of the First Seminole War.  Until 
that point, there had been two major generals, Jackson and Brown.43  Major General Jacob 
Brown became the first Commanding General in the post-war army.44  The Commanding 
General was in charge of the line command of the United States Army, all those men and officers 
excluding the staff officers.  He served as the figurehead of the army, as a go between for the 
Secretary of War and the line officers, and as a sounding board for the Secretary and the 
President.45 
 Both the General Staff and the Commanding General assisted in streamlining the army 
and allowing for a more efficient line of communications.  Yet these positions also created 
problems.  First, there were many disputes about the exact authority of the Commanding General 
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in relation to the Secretary of War.  Could the Commanding General actually command the 
Army, or was he to simply relate orders from the Secretary of War?  If so, then the title of 
Commanding General was merely honorific, with no real power.  Jacob Brown worked fairly 
harmoniously with Secretary of War John C. Calhoun and his successor, until Brown died in 
1828.  The second and third Commanding General, Alexander Macomb and Winfield Scott, both 
clashed with the Secretary of War over their respective powers.46 
 The twin positions of Secretary of War and Commanding General were destined to clash 
in the nineteenth century.  It was a dispute over who could command the Army.  In 1855, Scott 
became embroiled in a dispute with Secretary of War Jefferson Davis.  As the civilian agent of 
the President of the United States, strong willed Jefferson Davis, saw his position as the 
representation of the civilian authority over the military.  Therefore, the Secretary of War had to 
be able to command the Commanding General.  Davis and Scott’s dispute arose over the fact that 
Davis was communicating directly with Scott’s subordinates, bypassing Scott in the chain of 
command.  Scott took offense to this on the grounds that he was the head of the Army and any 
communications had to go through him first.47  A major fact that hindered the relations between 
the Commanding General and the Secretary of War was that the Commanding Generals held 
their position until they died, resigned, or were dismissed.  The Secretary of War, on the other 
hand, was replaced every few years.  This led to authority gravitating to the Commanding 
Generals. 
The General Staff provided a power struggle for both the Secretary of War and the 
Commanding General.  These bureau chiefs, held commissions for life and had a clearly defined 
role, contrary to that of the Commanding General.  “Secretaries rarely stayed in office more than 
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a few years, so power gravitated to the bureau chiefs, who held commissions for life.”48  
Quartermaster General Thomas S. Jesup and Commissary General George Gibson would hold 
their offices from 1818 to the 1860’s.49  Furthermore, the staff departments, which had been 
created after the War of1812, predated the office of the Commanding General.50  The Bureau 
Chiefs were answerable only to the Secretary of War, thereby negating the authority of the 
Commanding General.  As a result, a feud arose between the department heads and the 
Commanding General, and between the line and staff officers.51 
 
General Macomb recognized the scattering of authority in the General Staff.  Macomb 
sent a letter to the Secretary of War in July 1831 outlining the problem that the bureau chiefs 
reported to the Secretary and not to himself.  Due to the short tenure of the Secretaries, these 
bureau chiefs tended to acclimate power to themselves.  Under the present system “one would 
suppose they did not belong to the same service.”52  The War Department should make rules and 
regulations for the appointment of officers “but the command of Troops under the Executive, the 
maintaining discipline, the preservation of order andeconomy, the carrying into effect the 
commands of the Executive in reference to Military movements, properly belongs to the 
Commander of the Army.’53  Macomb ordered the other staff bureau chiefs to report to him 
frequently, and attempted to bring them under his control.  In 1830, he brought his Adjutant 
General, Colonel Roger Jones, on charges of disobeying his orders and communicating directly 
with the Secretary of War.  The court convicted Jones of insubordination, thereby strengthening 
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Macomb’s control of the other staff bureaus.  Macomb had early success in his career as 
Commanding General because of friendly administrations.  However he was never able to 
establish the perception that the Commanding General could control the other staff bureau 
chiefs.54 
The creation of the General Staff greatly increased the organization and efficiency of the 
American Army.  It allowed for detailed running of the American Army by taking responsibility 
away from the Secretary of War and institutionalizing specialized bureaus.  However, the power 
struggle between the bureau chiefs, Commanding General, and Secretary of War would continue 
until 1903 when the staff and the line would “be integrated into a general staff capable of 
planning and coordinating military operations with unity, harmony, and efficiency…”55 
 A major problem for the American military ever since the American Revolution had been 
its lack of uniformity.  From Baron von Steuben in 1777, to Anthony Wayne in 1791, to the War 
of 1812, general officers had found it necessary to standardize the drill and training of the 
regiments within their commands.  Yet, different army commanders often decided on different 
training manuals for their troops, thereby impairing any army composed of two different forces.  
Towards the end of the War of 1812, and immediately after, the Madison administration and 
army officers sought to remedy this persisting problem within the army.   
The overriding overseer of the uniform alteration of the army in the decades after the War 
of 1812 was General Winfield Scott.  He was not an academy trained professional, but he would 
be one of the most influential military commanders in professionalizing the United States Army 
in the first half of the nineteenth century.  He experienced the military failures in the first two 
years of the War of 1812.  He was the commander at the military training camp at Flint Hill in 
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Buffalo during the summer of 1814.  He led a brigade during the 1814 Niagara campaign and 
was prominent at the Battles of Chippewa and Lundy’s Lane, where he was wounded.56  While 
he convalesced he conversed with the Madison administration.  In December 1814, Congress 
appointed a board of officers, headed by Scott, to prepare an official manual of infantry tactics 
and drill based on the 1791 French manual.57  In two months the board had written the manual 
and it officially became the infantry manual of the United States Army.  This manual, revised in 
1824 and 1835, remained the army’s infantry manual until the 1850’s.58  In addition to infantry 
tactics, Scott was also on a board in 1826 that organized a system of artillery, cavalry, and rifle 
tactics.  By 1830, the United States Army had a collection of uniform tactics for every branch of 
the service.59 
In 1818 Scott began working on the army regulations, the General Regulations for the 
Army (or Scott’s Institutes).  After two years of work, Congress finally approved these as the 
official regulations of the United States Army.  These regulations gave minute detail on every 
aspect of the army.  It covered all details of discipline and administration, returns and reports, 
dress, military honors, all printed within a logical framework.  This allowed new officers, or 
transferred officers, to quickly adjust to their new responsibilities with as little difficulty as 
possible.  Anything that an officer needed to get information on, he could find in the 
Regulations.  According to Scott the work contained, “all that can be desired for an army, in the 
field-excepting tactics, strategy, and engineering…”60  This work was a major step in the 
standardization of the United States Army.61 
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 In 1817, Sylvanus Thayer became the superintendent of the Military Academy of West 
Point.62  Thayer authored the transformation of West Point into the premier military academy in 
the country that it would be at the time of the American Civil War and beyond.  Thayer modeled 
the academy on two French military academies, the Ecole Polytechnique and the School of 
Application for Engineers and Artillery at Metz.  The French academies stressed tactics, 
fortification, and military engineering.  All of these had been put on display and glorified during 
the Napoleonic Wars.  The Prussian academies focused on strategy and military policy, but these 
were not stressed at West Point.  The Franco-Prussian War in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century would show the superiority of the Prussian thought.63 
First, Thayer created an Academic Board consisting of permanent professors at the 
academy that would meet with the superintendent to determine academic policy.  A four year 
curriculum was approved upon, as well as set requirements of proficiency that the cadets would 
have to meet.  Up to this point of time, there was no set number of years that a cadet had to 
attend at West Point.  The curriculum was extended beyond engineering to other subjects such 
as, chemistry, French, drawing, mathematics, general history, moral philosophy, geography, 
ethics, and law.  Thayer established the office of commandant of cadets, whose duty it was to 
conduct the training of cadets.  The West Point cadets also had to participate in three two-month 
summer encampments for military field exercises.64 
Thayer sent several officers to Europe to study contemporary European military thought; 
one such example was Dennis Hart Mahan.  Mahan, an 1822 West Point graduate, was sent to 
France in 1826 and enrolled at the academy at Metz.  Upon returning, he lectured on 
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engineering, tactics, and military thought at West Point until 1871.65  The officers, sent to 
Europe, were also responsible for buying and bringing back European military manuals for the 
library at the academy.  This had the effect of producing scores of well-educated junior military 
officers who entered into the American Army.   
 In addition to West Point, the American military attempted to further increase military 
education.  In 1820 Secretary of War John C. Calhoun stated that, “whatever degree of perfection 
may be given to the Military Academy at West Point, as an elementary school, yet our military 
education, in the higher branches of the art of war, must remain imperfect, without a school of 
application and practice.66  In the 1820s two post-graduate military schools were established, the 
Artillery School of Practice at Fortress Monroe in 1824, and the Infantry School of Practice at 
Jefferson Barracks in 1826.67  These two schools were attempts at further educating promising 
young officers in particular subjects.  The Artillery School offered studies on a great range of 
topics including maneuvers, seacoast artillery, preparation of all types of ammunition, 
fortification, etc.  It was designated to be encamped two months a year, and the school was 
allowed a permanent staff.  The Infantry School was founded in 1826 with emphasis on 
discipline and military spirit rather than tactics.  Both of these schools were based on French 
examples.  Companies were rotated throughout the schools and many West Point graduates drew 
them as their first assignments.  However, by 1834 a lack of interest by Commanding General 
Macomb and the administration, combined with a lack of funds had effectively ended these two 
schools.68  Although these schools did not become permanent institutions within the American 
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military, they did represent an interest in furthering the specialization and professionalization of 
the American officer corps. 
A reality of the United States Army in the 1820s and 1830s was that it resembled the pre-
War of 1812 army in many ways.  It was still relatively small and spread out over many isolated 
frontier posts.  The difference was that there were a higher proportion of officers in the army, 
due to Calhoun’s “skeleton army,” and that many of these officers were career long 
professionals.  In addition, the uniform military manuals in the army allowed for easy transition 
and communication between officers in separate posts.  Many of the officers were career 
professionals.  Career professionals will be termed as those officers who stay at least twenty 
years in the army. 
William Skelton conducted a survey on the career length of the officers named on the 
army registers for the years 1797, 1830, and 1860.  The median career length for all the officers 
was 10 years in 1797, 22 years in 1830, and 23 years in 1860.  The percentage of the officer 
corps serving twenty years was 12.7 % in 1797, 57.1 % in 1830, and 56.0 % in 1860.  The 
percentage of the officer corps serving thirty years was 2.6 % in 1797, 37.7 % in 1830, and 41.5 
% in 1860.  In another survey, Skelton examines the career length of men appointed to the lowest 
commissioned ranks in 1792-94, 1821-1823, 1831-1833, and 1841-1843.  Most officers received 
their first commissions in their early twenties as a second lieutenant.  The median career length 
of these officers doubled from 6 years in 1792-1794 to 12 years in 1821-1823.  The growth of 
the officers qualifying as careerists went from 3.5 % in 1792-1794 to 31.3 % in 1821-1823.69  
These surveys reveal that officers, especially young officers, increasingly saw the army as their 
profession after the War of 1812.  This was a major difference from the pre-1812 officer corps.   
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An agency concerned with strategic thinking about the defense of the American nation 
was the Board of Engineers.  American commanders and society had always stressed 
fortifications as an effective strategic necessity.  A navy and fortifications were seen as less of a 
threat than a large standing army.  A strong set of fortifications and a small navy, was thought, 
would not antagonize the European powers, especially Great Britain.70  The Board of Engineers 
was created in 1816, and consisted of three board members and two attached members, all from 
the Corps of Engineers.71  These professionally trained officers had the responsibility to envision 
possible invasion sites, choose sites for fortifications, classify these sites in terms of priority, and 
estimate the number of militia that could be concentrated at points between one and ten days 
after an enemy landing.72  The board was in charge of supervising construction of coastal 
fortifications. 
There were some American officers who opposed this defensive strategy.  General 
Edmund Gaines, one of the army’s two brigadier generals in the 1820s and 1830s, argued against 
major fortifications as obsolete against a determined navy.  His solution was a greater emphasis 
on roads, railroads, and canals which would allow for a more rapid concentration of forces once 
an enemy landed.73  However, the fortification strategy predominated throughout the nineteenth 
century.  The Board of Engineers, while its strategy was disputed, was yet another area of 
specialization in the American Army in the post-War of 1812 years. 
 It is certain that by the 1830s the United States Army had become a professional army.  
Following the War of 1812 the Secretary of War had created the General Staff and the position 
of Commanding General which alleviated pressure on the Secretary.  This command structure 
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allowed for a more comprehensible chain of command.  The tactics manuals and army 
regulations finally addressed the issue of uniformity among the units of the American military.  
The West Point Military Academy standardized its curriculum and began yearly producing 
military educated young officers who would fill the lower ranks of the army.  Officers held 
career positions in the army for decades.  There were still some problems in the army.  The 
General Staff would bicker with the Commanding General and the Secretary of War.  The army 
had been reduced by Congress to fewer than 10,000 men and spread out over the frontier.  The 
advanced schools of military science, the artillery and infantry school, eventually closed in the 
1830s.  Despite these setbacks the United States Army was a professional army.   
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Chapter 5: Vindication of the Army: The Mexican War 
 
The best illustration of the professionalization of the American Army would be the 
Army’s results in the Mexican War.  Mexico had refused to accept the results of the Texas 
Revolution of 1835.  In 1845, the United States annexed Texas.  Once the annexation of Texas 
happened, Mexico broke off relations with the United States government.  The ignition to this 
powder keg of hostility happened when Texas and Mexico disputed Texas’ southern border.  
Texas claimed it was the Rio Grande, but Mexico insisted it was the Nueces River.  President 
Polk sent an army under General Zachary Taylor to the Rio Grande.  A portion of this force 
clashed with the Mexican forces in the area in April 1846.  On May 13, the United States 
declared war on Mexico.  The goal of Polk’s administration was to force Mexico to cede the 
New Mexico and Californian territory as well as all claims to Texas south to the Rio Grande.  
The army therefore took on an offensive stance.1 
There were two main American armies in the Mexican War.  The first was under General 
Zachary Taylor.  The second was under Major General Winfield Scott.  Both of these 
commanders had entered the army in 1808 and from then on were lifelong careerists.2  These two 
leaders can be contrasted with the leaders at the beginning of the War of 1812, Generals 
Dearborn, Hull, and Wilkinson.  Of those three men, only Wilkinson had remained in the army 
from the American Revolution.  In age, the three generals in the War of 1812 and Scott and 
Taylor were relatively close.  However the latter two had stayed in the army and had seen 
extensive service throughout their careers.  That was the difference between the high command 
at the beginning of the War of 1812 and the Mexican War. 
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The militia was very seldom used in the Mexican War.  At the beginning of the war, 
Taylor called out 1,390 three month militia and General Gaines followed by mobilizing 11,211 
six-month militiamen.  On May 13, 1846, Congress extended the militia’s term of service to six 
months.  However most of the militiamen called up were not actually used in combat.  Carl 
Edward Skeen states that, “Although 12,601 militiamen were used during the Mexican War, they 
comprised only 12 percent of the total force, compared to 88 percent in the War of 1812.”3  To 
take the place of the common militia Congress, on the same day that they declared war, called 
for 50,000 volunteers to serve for twelve months or the duration of the war.  The Mexican War 
highlighted the “skeleton” army that Secretary of War Calhoun had argued for in 1821.  At the 
outbreak of the war, the Regular Army consisted of 8,600 soldiers.  In May 1846, Congress 
increased the number of privates, doubling the Regular Army’s strength.  In February 1847, 
Congress added ten more regiments to the army.  In all, 30,476 men served in the Regular Army 
during the Mexican War.4  While the army did use volunteers in the war, the Regular Army was 
more relied upon by General Winfield Scott.  In General Winfield Scott’s army that conducted 
the Mexico City Campaign, there were two divisions of regulars and two of volunteers.5  It was 
not until the American Civil War that mass mobilization of the populace would take place.  The 
Mexican War was a showcase for the small Regular Army.6 
In the first phase of the war, General Taylor advanced from San Antonio south into 
Mexican territory.  From May to September 1846, Taylor repeatedly defeated larger Mexican 
armies, and pushed them south of Monterrey.  In October 1846, Congress allowed General 
Winfield Scott to conduct a new strategy.  Scott took more than half of Taylor’s men and, 
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combined with reinforcements, sailed his army and assaulted Veracruz.  In February 1847, 
Taylor defeated an army under Santa Anna at the Battle of Buena Vista.  This battle was 
significant because Taylor had 4,500 men, almost 90 percent volunteers who had never seen 
battle, against Santa Anna’s 15,000.  From March to September 1847 Scott with roughly 10,000 
regulars and volunteers conducted a campaign from Veracruz to Mexico City.  During the 
campaign, Scott defeated Santa Anna’s army at several battles until he reached the walls of 
Mexico City itself.  In a series of battles, Scott’s 10,000 man army defeated Santa Anna’s 25,000 
man army and marched into the city on September 13, 1847.  On March 10, 1848, the Treaty of 
Guadalupe Hidalgo was ratified.7 
In less than two years the United States Army had defeated the Mexican Army at 
numerous battles.  In many of these battles the American armies were outnumbered.  While the 
Mexican Army was not comparable to the British, the result was still an indication of the great 
strides the United States Army had made since the War of 1812.  The army had a logical line of 
command, well trained junior officers, and a competent military bureaucracy.  This enabled the 
field commanders to have a better chance for battle field victories, as was shown in the war.  
Wayne Wei-siang Hsieh has said that, “On the level of corporate organization, the war 
vindicated the regular army’s faith in all the laborious reforms enacted after the War of 1812 to 
professionalize the American military establishment.”8 
One of the hallmarks of the Mexican War was the performance of the junior officers.  
These officers were predominantly West Point trained.  These men would go on to hold high 
positions on both armies in the American Civil War.  Timothy Johnson asserts that, “The war 
with Mexico marks the first major conflict in which West Point graduates comprised a majority 
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of the officer corps, and Scott relied heavily on their engineering and reconnaissance skills.”9  
While they did not dominate the upper command level of the army, the West Point graduates 
filled the junior officer levels.  Furthermore, many West Point graduates who had resigned their 
commission received volunteer commissions.  This provided the volunteer regiments with 
militarily educated officers.  Millet and Maslowski state that the: 
Mexican War volunteers occasionally performed badly, but normally they fought as 
tenaciously as regulars, demonstrating anew what Scott had proved at Chippewa and 
Lundy’s Lane: good leaders could quickly transform ordinary citizens into excellent 
soldiers.10 
 
In Taylor’s battles, especially at Buena Vista, much credit has been given to his professional 
subordinates who made up for his limitations as a field commander.11  The curriculum at West 
Point produced far better military engineers.  Yet the tactical training at the military academy 
proved sufficient to turn out skillful battlefield leaders.12  It was these professional junior 
officers, trained by West Point instructors that helped the American forces win numerous battles 
in the Mexican War. 
 
The contrast between the United States Army at the beginning of the War of 1812 and the 
Mexican War thirty years later clearly shows that the army had professionalized.  The Mexican 
War was the vindication of the peacetime professionalization.  This is attested to by various 
authors.  Russell Weigley maintains that during the thirty years between the two wars, the army 
became increasingly professional.13  At the outbreak of the Mexican War, “the new professional 
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army was highly confident of itself, and-the Mexican War would seem to show-with good 
cause.”14 
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Conclusion 
 
By the Mexican War, the American Army had achieved the requisite goals of a 
professional army in the nineteenth century, as related in the introduction.  First, the 
civilian/military officers of the eighteenth century army had been replaced with full time career 
officers.  Second, the West Point curriculum had been defined in 1817 and since then the 
academy had been turning out scores of trained officers annually.  Third, the army’s 
administration and organization had been greatly increased with the formation of the General 
Staff and Commanding General.  Fourth, as is shown by the increased number of soldiers and 
officers in the peacetime decades, American society had begun to tolerate a small, but 
professional army.  Last, uniform tactics manuals and the army regulations were written.  These 
manuals finally created a uniform military and solved the problem of standard drilling 
instruction. 
The 1820s and 1830s cemented the professionalization of the United States Army.  The 
War of 1812, however, was the key to the professionalization of the army.  This war produced 
young officers who identified with the military, made it their careers, and spearheaded the 
changes to the army.  A few of the top career commanders produced by the war were Jacob 
Brown, Alexander Macomb, Winfield Scott, and Edmund Pendleton Gaines. 
Jacob Brown received his first military training as a secretary under Alexander Hamilton 
in the New Army in 1798.  He entered into the New York militia in 1807 and served in it until 
the war.  He fought in most of the battles in the Northern Theater, commanding a brigade and 
then a division.  He was promoted to Major General.  In 1821, Brown became the first 
Commanding General, which would eventually come to be called the Army Chief of Staff.  He 
worked closely with Secretary of War Calhoun to help professionalize the army.  John Morris 
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believes that many of the things that Calhoun is credited for were spurred on by Brown.  This 
was because after 1821 when Brown became Commanding General, he met with Calhoun on a 
daily basis.  There correspondence was more face to face than written down.  Therefore actions 
that Calhoun put into place, might in fact have been suggested by Brown.1  When Brown died in 
1828, President John Quincy Adams stated that: 
General Brown was one of the eminent men of this age and nation.  Though bred a 
Quaker, he was a man of lofty and martial spirit, and in the late war contributed perhaps 
more than any other man to redeem and establish the military character of his 
country…The splendor of the defence of New Orleans has cast in the shade Brown’s 
military fame, and his campaign on the Canadian frontier in 1814, far more severely 
contested than were the achievements of Jackson-less aided by good fortune and less 
favored by egregious errors of the enemy.2 
 
 Alexander Macomb entered the New York militia at age sixteen in 1798.  He then was 
commissioned as a cornet in the Regular Army a year later.  He was commissioned a first 
lieutenant in the Army Corps of Engineers at West Point.  At the outbreak of the War of 1812 he 
was Acting Adjutant General of the Army and in the command of an artillery regiment.  He 
became famous for defeating the British army under Prevost at the Battle of Plattsburgh on 
September 11, 1814.  With only 1,500 regular troops and some militia, Macomb stymied a 
British army over 10,000 men.  Macomb became the second Commanding General when Brown 
died in 1828.  Macomb retained this position until he died in 1841.3 
Winfield Scott entered the military as a captain of artillery in the 1808 expansion.  He 
was a lieutenant colonel when the war started.  He fought at the Battle of Queenston Heights in 
1812, the 1813 Niagara campaign, the Montreal campaign, and was crucial in the 1814 Niagara 
campaign.  He went on to help author the army’s infantry tactics manual and the army’s 
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regulations.  He became Commanding General in 1841 and remained so until 1861.  He 
commanded in the Second Seminole War, the Nullification Crisis, the Creek War, and took 
center stage in the Mexican War.  He, more than any other commander in the first half of the 
nineteenth century, was responsible for the professionalization of the United States Army.4 
 Edmund Pendleton Gaines enlisted in the army in 1799.  He began the War of 1812 as a 
major.  He fought in the Montreal campaign of 1813, at the Battle of the Thames, and at Fort 
Erie in 1814.  He and Scott became the two brigadier generals in the army in 1821.  He 
commanded the Western Department.  He participated in the Black Hawk War, the Second 
Seminole War, and the Mexican War.  He was a noted Indian fighter and strategic thinker, as 
was shown earlier.  Gaines opposed the fixation of the military on European tactics which were 
then being focused at West Point and personified by Winfield Scott.5 
 In addition to the top commanders, many junior officers gained their first experience in 
the War of 1812.  Thomas Jesup joined the army in the 1808 expansion.  He was a leader of one 
of Scott’s regiments during the 1814 Niagara campaign, and performed well in battle.  He 
became Quartermaster General on May 8, 1818 and retained that position until his death in 1860.  
He was instrumental in the formation of the Quartermaster Department up to the American Civil 
War.  He participated under Scott in the Creek War.  He also commanded the American forces in 
the Second Seminole War from 1836 to 1838.6 
 William J. Worth entered the army in 1812.  He served as an aide to Scott during the 
1814 Niagara campaign and was wounded at the Battle of Lundy’s Lane.  He went on to become 
Commandant of Cadets at West Point.  He commanded the army in the Second Seminole War.  
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He eventually became a general and was commander of the first division of Scott’s Mexico City 
invasion army.7 
 Zachary Taylor entered the United States Army in the 1808 expansion.  As a captain he 
fought in many Indian battles prior to and during the War of 1812.  Taylor stayed in the army 
after the war and participated in the Black Hawk War and commanded the army in the Second 
Seminole War from 1838 to 1840.  He went on to become a major general and gain fame for his 
victories in the Mexican War.  He parlayed this notoriety to become the President of the United 
States.8 
 Sylvanus Thayer was commissioned a second lieutenant in 1808 after graduating from 
the military Academy at West Point.  During the War of 1812 Thayer was an aide to General 
Wade Hampton during the 1813 Montreal campaign.  He also directed the fortification and 
defense of Norfolk, Virginia.  In 1815 he travelled to Europe and studied for two years at the 
Ecole Polytechnique.  Upon his return in 1817, President Monroe named him the Superintendent 
of West Point.  He held this position until 1833.  He was called the father of West Point for the 
programs that he started there, which has already been related.  After his resignation in 1833, 
Thayer remained in the Army Corps of Engineers until 1863.9 
 John E. Wool, a storekeeper, was commissioned a captain in 1812.  He was responsible 
for gaining the heights at the Battle of Queenston Heights in 1812.  He went on to command a 
regiment at the Battle of Plattsburgh.  In 1816 he became Inspector General of the Army.  He 
stayed in the army, commanding a division in General Taylor’s army during the Mexican War.  
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He finally retired in 1863, becoming the oldest general to command troops in the American Civil 
War.10 
These officers assisted in the several changes to the army in the interim between the War 
of 1812 and the Mexican War.  The curriculum at West Point was reworked and set at a 
mandatory four years by Sylvanus Thayer.  West Point turned out at least twenty officers per 
year until the American Civil War.11  West Point produced many junior officers who filled the 
ranks of the army.  The General Staff and Commanding General positions were finalized by 
1821.  This allowed for a more rapid delivery of orders and a more comprehensible command 
structure than what had existed in the army.  Many of the General Staff, including the first three 
Commanding Generals, had extensive experience in the War of 1812.  The Board of Engineers, 
created in 1816, focused on the strategic concerns of the American nation.  Winfield Scott 
assisted in writing the infantry tactics manual in 1814, and authored the army’s regulations in 
1821.  All of these aspects of professionalization in the peacetime years, had their origins in the 
War of 1812 or within ten years from the war.   
America has a long tradition of militia forces.  It began with the English militia tradition, 
which was then transported across the ocean and grew in America.  The Continental Army and 
the first American Army had provided seeds of professionalization for the nineteenth century 
American Army.  By the mid nineteenth century, the state militia had been replaced as a fighting 
force by the volunteer.  These soldiers enlisted for twelve months to several years, as opposed to 
the militiaman’s three months.  The volunteer was used in the Mexican War and made up the 
majority of the soldiers in the American Civil War.12  Yet, America had learned to accept a small 
professional army with a number of professional officers.  The peacetime in the early nineteenth 
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century pushed forward the professionalization of the United States Army, but the War of 1812 
had an indelible effect on the army and on the nation at large.  As this thesis has argued, the War 
of 1812 was the driving force behind the professionalization of the United States Army. 
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